

NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION/PEACE TRAINING AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION PUBLIC
OPINION SURVEY

MOVING TOWARD TRANSITION

A Survey of Opinion Leaders in Southern Afghanistan As the United States Begins its Drawdown

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Executive Summary

This New America Foundation (NAF) and Peace Training and Research Organisation (PTRO) have released the findings from a joint public opinion survey in southern Afghanistan.

Respondents want an end to foreign interference

The conflict between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban in the country's south, which will likely continue after the 2014 transition, remains a hurting stalemate. The respondents resent all belligerents. With the levels of violence and civilian casualties reaching their


highest levels since the fall of the Taliban, most respondents in Kandahar (80 percent), and half in Helmand (49 percent), thought Afghanistan was heading in the wrong direction. In Kandahar, 92 percent of respondents believe the Taliban are stronger or have the same capability as they did a year ago. While the respondents are split between support for the government and the Taliban, the respondents primarily blame ISAF, Pakistan, Iran, and India, as well as global *jihadists* such as al Qaeda for the insecurity in their country.

Nevertheless, there is a strong demand for the United States to play a constructive and potentially unique role up to and beyond the 2014 transition of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). According to the respondents in the survey, the most important matter the United States should focus on is addressing the various forms of interference from other states—namely Pakistan, Iran and India—in Afghanistan's affairs.

Doubts about transition

Many of the respondents expressed doubt that the transition will bring about substantial change in their lives, because they already see the current conflict as a continuation of the civil war that started in 1989. Nearly

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three-quarters of respondents are inclined to believe that violence in Afghanistan is going to continue after 2014, likely in the form of a bloody civil war. The Taliban are part of the demographic landscape for many respondents, and “defeating” the Taliban is not necessarily a high priority for them; instead, they are more interested in addressing a range of perceived injustices from the current Afghan government, which is seen by many as corrupt.

This report is based on 200 interviews with local opinion leaders carried out in Kandahar and Helmand in March 2011 and research material collected by PTRO staff across southern Afghanistan in recent years. The sample was created through “snowball sampling,” where researchers deliberately select potential respondents. Snowball sampling was chosen to reduce social desirability—a dynamic in which respondents give interviewers answers that they believe the interviewer wants to hear. There have been no comprehensive studies on social desirability bias in Afghanistan, but anecdotal evidence and experience from a number of practitioners suggests it is high, possibly as high as 50 percent. A randomized sample cannot control for social desirability in Afghanistan for the following three reasons.

Security for many respondents, particularly in Kandahar, is not improving, and while there is a risk of a deteriorating security situation in Helmand as transition begins to Afghan security forces, many respondents already view the current situation as being akin to civil war. Transition alone will not address the risk of the deteriorating security environment. While the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan provides some of the motivation for the continued insurgency, this alone has never fully explained the strength of resistance against the Afghan government. This is because many of those fighting the government had fought some of the current national leaders in previous periods, including Afghanistan’s *jihad* against the Soviet invaders and the subsequent civil war. And many combatants are fighting this government simply because they view it as illegitimate.

Major concerns about governance persist

While the respondents identify economic and development needs, their biggest concerns are governance related. In both provinces, the respondents had mixed views of civil administration. This contrasts with the respondents having very unfavorable views of the Afghan National Police in both Kandahar (59 percent) and Helmand (30 percent). Seventy percent of respondents have a very favorable view of the Afghan National Army. This highly mixed picture is despite the massive expenditure of money and effort in governance, security and development programs in the provinces, in particular by the United States.

The very high levels of spending also may have contributed to the perception of rampant government corruption among 86 percent of the respondents. This level of corruption and associated injustice is eroding the remaining trust in the Afghan government. These are clearly challenges for the Afghan government, but they also represent challenges to the way the United States should do business in Afghanistan in the future.

Withdrawal won’t solve Afghanistan’s problems

While the respondents have an avowedly negative view of **all** foreign interference in Afghanistan, they recognize that the issues they face are not simply going to be resolved by the withdrawal of ISAF troops. Even with international forces gone, they will still face an uncertain and potentially unfriendly regional arena, and a fragmented and at times predatory government. Instead, the respondents indicate a complex understanding of their environment and identify their biggest concerns about their own country as addressing the afflictions of corruption and the disconnect between local and national governance in Afghanistan.

Based on the data, that there are three main areas where engagement by the United States should be robust: 1) curtailing the influence of neighboring states in Afghanistan 2) continuing to train and professionalize the

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), in particular the police, and 3) developing civilian assistance in specific sectors.

Methodology

This report is based on a survey of 200 local opinion leaders carried out using structured interviews in Kandahar City and Helmand province in March 2011 by the Peace Training and Research Organisation (PTRO) on behalf of the New America Foundation (NAF). In addition, the report draws from the cumulative experience of PTRO's research staff who have conducted both qualitative and quantitative interviews with thousands of residents of a range of political backgrounds in urban and rural areas of Kandahar and Helmand in recent years, as well as a review of contextual secondary material.

The sample was created through a “snowball sampling” frame where researchers deliberately select potential respondents. Snowball sampling was chosen to reduce social desirability—a dynamic in which respondents give interviewers answers that they believe the interviewer wants to hear.¹ There have been no comprehensive studies on social desirability bias in Afghanistan, but anecdotal evidence and experience from a number of practitioners suggests it is high, possibly as high as 50 percent. A randomized sample cannot control for social desirability in Afghanistan.

First, in the context of Helmand and Kandahar, where security is so constrained, it is imperative to gain the trust of the respondents for honest answers to be recorded. Therefore, time was taken to talk with the respondents about their participation, often over several days, to make sure they were happy to participate openly. Secondly, given that there is no census in Afghanistan, it is not clear what is being randomized in a random sample, because the actual composition of the overall population is unknown, including the most basic data such as the number of people living in districts and their ethnic, tribal and linguistic

backgrounds, let alone more complex data such as an accurate dataset on the ages of different cohorts (i.e. under 18; 19-25 and so on). These limitations on randomized sampling led the research team to select snowball sampling as a more reliable approach in the Afghan context. In addition, there have also been specific concerns raised about the reliability of randomized polling in Kandahar recently.²

The choice of snowball sampling does, however, limit the use of statistical analysis, as a confidence level cannot be set. As a result, the findings highlighted in this paper focus on the most significant issues; i.e., results highlighted in the report are those where a very high proportion of respondents chose a particular response, normally upwards of two-thirds. Other findings with more mixed responses may be of interest, but their relative weight and importance is lower in comparison with data points where respondents seem to consistently choose one set of responses.

Ethnically and tribally, the 200 respondents were from a representative range of backgrounds, including 161 Durrani Pashtuns³, 28 Ghilzai Pashtuns⁴ and 11 respondents from other groups.⁵ This largely reflects the ethnic balance in the sample areas, and importantly within the Durrani there is a balance between the largest sub-groups including the Alikozai (28), Alizai (26), Barakzai (24), Noorzai (31) and Popalzai (22), with a slightly smaller proportion of Achickzai (19) and Ishaqzai (11). This allows the sample to present a broad spectrum of views including the major Pashtun groups as well as smaller Pashtun groups and other ethnic minorities.

The median age of the respondents was 37 years old (average 38.7 years-old), meaning that they are above the estimated median age in Afghanistan, which is 18.2 years.⁶ But this age bias also reflects the fact that younger respondents would often defer to their head of the household to provide answers, in keeping with common Afghan cultural practices. Therefore, this sample is largely composed of local opinion formers who represent many

individuals in their responses. One hundred and three respondents had attended school, giving an illiteracy rate of 48.5 percent in the sample set, slightly lower than the estimated illiteracy rate of 56.9 percent for men.⁷ Those that had attended school did so for an average of 9.85 years, meaning they had on average completed their education until the end of middle school. The average school attendance in Afghanistan is estimated at 11 years for men.⁸ Forty seven respondents had attended religious schools, or *madrassas*, on average for 4.84 years. Twenty-two respondents had attended both state and *madrassa* education establishments.

The 200 respondents were from six municipal districts in Kandahar city (100); 57 were from Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand, and a further 43 from nine other districts in Helmand.⁹ The sample is predominantly urban, which is reflected in the employment status of the respondents. Sixty-one percent described themselves as working, full-time (40.5 percent) or part-time (20.5 percent); 36 percent described themselves as unemployed, either looking for work (21.5 percent) or not looking for work (14.5 percent). This more or less corresponds with national estimates,¹⁰ but caution must be exercised with employment statistics in Afghanistan, given the propensity for respondents to move between multiple functions and jobs; for example, some elders in the sample described themselves as unemployed, despite having a social function from which they may also accrue financial benefit. For example, if the elder acts as the controller of water distribution in their area in the capacity as an elder, they may also receive financial compensation without being formally employed.

This also accounts for the purported drop in “unemployment” when respondents were asked what their primary occupation is or was – some were reporting their past occupation as being current, even if they also described themselves as unemployed. The sample is clearly biased in favor of the urban economy, in keeping with the fact that 78.5 percent of the sample come from the cities of

Kandahar and Lashkar Gah. A detailed breakdown of respondents’ occupations includes elders or religious leaders, 9.5 percent; farmers (both agricultural and livestock), 7 percent; government employees (including health workers and teachers), 12 percent; NGO or private development company staff, 4.5 percent; private sector workers (i.e. shopkeepers and small businessmen), 29.5 percent; skilled /semi-skilled laborers, 14.5 percent; students, 3.5 percent; unemployed, 18 percent (discrepancy noted above); unknown, 1.5 percent.

The analysis of the data excludes “Do Not Know” and “Refused to Answer” categories. For most questions this was a handful of respondents, but the nature of refusals was connected to the sensitivity of some of the questions, where a few respondents were concerned about personal safety and opted to skip the question. Therefore the difference between “Do Not Know” and “Refused” was often unclear, and removing them from the sample was the only consistent way to treat both categories. Five very sensitive sub questions were not analyzed because the refusal rate was above 20 people, or 10 percent of the sample. Averages are calculated from the remaining respondents, which are listed (i.e. n=199) next to each data point in the tables or in the endnotes.

Security

Helmand and Kandahar have both been the focus of massive increases in ISAF, particularly U.S., troop deployments since President Barack Obama announced a “surge” of forces in 2009, but the respondents have divergent views about the direction of the country and their own personal safety. There are currently approximately 30,000 ISAF troops in Helmand province alone, and thousands in Kandahar city and province.¹¹ In Helmand there have been hard-fought, very kinetic operations to dislodge Taliban insurgents from the area between Lashkar Gah, Nahr-I Sarraj, Nad-I Ali, Marja and Nawa-I Barakzai, the central zone of the province, which seems to have increased the freedom of movement of government officials

and the broader population, a fact that complements the findings that respondents in Helmand thought that the Taliban had been weakened in the last 12 months (see below).¹²

In Kandahar, however, *Hamkari*,¹³ the name for the process to secure the city and the surrounding districts which started in April 2010, has been inconclusive. Kandahar still suffers from ongoing insurgent activity in the city, ranging from low-level assassinations against lone police¹⁴ to high-profile assassinations. Before the research was carried out the deputy governor of Kandahar Province, the mayor of Kandahar city and other government officials had been killed.¹⁵ Subsequently, the Chief of Police Brigadier General Khan Mohammad Mujahid was killed on April 15 and nearly 500 Taliban fighters, including many commanders, escaped from Sarpoza prison¹⁶ on April 25 which may have led to the Taliban commando operation into Kandahar city on May 8.¹⁷ Finally, on July 12, Ahmad Wali Karzai, head of the Kandahar Provincial Council, the half-brother of President Karzai was assassinated at his home by his head of security, though it is unclear at the time of publication what prompted his killing.¹⁸

Given this background, it is unsurprising that the respondents in Kandahar gave a very negative view of the direction of the country, with 83 percent stating it was going in the wrong direction. In Helmand the respondents were split 51/49 percent between those who thought it was going in the right or wrong direction, respectively.¹⁹ Similarly, 97 percent of Kandahari and 55 percent of Helmandi respondents²⁰ thought their personal safety was worse now than under the Taliban regime.²¹ For Kandahar, these figures are substantially worse than those reported by the outgoing Canadian military from their recent polling.²²

The security dynamics are dire for the respondents in Kandahar, though respondents in Helmand seem to be responding to the improved security in the areas adjoining Lashkar Gah, where 57 percent of the respondents come from. Sixty percent of the 43 respondents in other districts

indicated that security is worse now than under the Taliban.²³ Given that this was the last period of relative stability in Afghanistan, it is accurate to say there has been progress in some parts of Helmand, though it is not universal.

The much worse views about security in Kandahar can be attributed to the ongoing contest between ISAF, the Afghan Government and the Taliban in the city and its surrounding areas. Despite the increased level of troops, 53 percent of Kandahari respondents thought the Taliban had become stronger in the last 12 months, and 39 percent thought they were the same; 8 percent thought they were weaker. Almost the opposite was reported by the Helmandi respondents; 3 percent thought the Taliban had become stronger, 69.7 percent thought they had become weaker, and 27.3 percent thought that their level of strength had stayed the same.²⁴ While some have claimed that the *Hamkari* process has been a success,²⁵ it is not clear that across either Helmand or Kandahar ISAF operations have managed to secure the population in a sustainable manner. Increases in attacks each year initiated by insurgent groups have been recorded in both Kandahar (21 percent) and Helmand (76 percent) in the first quarter of 2011.²⁶

The increased deployments and levels of violence expose a further element of the asymmetric nature of the conflict which means that the respondents blame ISAF, as foreign forces, for much of the violence that they experience. Ninety eight and a half percent of respondents thought civilian casualties were a very important problem with the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, while 95 percent also noted night raids and 75.5 percent detentions as important problems.²⁷ This is despite the reality that the insurgents are responsible for the majority of civilian casualties. According to the UN, insurgents caused 80 percent of the 1,462 non-combatant deaths in the first six months of 2011. Pro-government forces (ISAF and the Afghan government) accounted for 14 percent of civilian casualties. Additionally, 79 deaths were caused by air strikes during this time, a 14 percent increase on the same period in 2010.²⁸

Taliban tactics did not receive the same level of concern. Seventy seven and a half percent of respondents (93 percent in Helmand) said the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) was a very important problem with Taliban tactics, and 42.7 percent of respondents (64 percent in Helmand, 21.2 percent in Kandahar city) thought that *Shabnameh* (night letters), used to threaten local populations, were also a very important problem. The differences between Kandahar and Helmand may be explained by differences in the approach of the insurgents in the different provinces; in Helmand there is a greater use of IEDs, which nationwide was the single biggest cause of civilian casualties in the first six months of 2011, causing 444 fatalities, while in Kandahar the insurgents are more entrenched among the population and don't feel the need to use night-letters and indiscriminate IEDs, favoring instead targeted assassinations and complex attacks.²⁹

In fact, one of the biggest criticisms of the Taliban by the respondents was not their tactics, but their perceived dependence on Pakistan

In fact, one of the biggest criticisms of the Taliban by the respondents was not their tactics, but their perceived dependence on Pakistan. Sixty five percent of respondents thought it was very important that the Taliban may be under Pakistani control (51.7 percent of Kandahari respondents and 77 percent of Helmandis).³⁰ Significantly, this does not then mean respondents blame the Taliban for the level of violence, rather they blame Pakistan for interfering through their perceived control of the Taliban.

This feature of the concern of foreign interference is striking across the respondents, and colors their views of **all** non-Afghan parties to the conflict. As reflected in Table 1 below, most of the respondents (82.5 percent) blame external actors for insecurity, and share the blame between

al-Qaeda, Pakistan and the United States. However, the responsibility of the Afghan government and the Quetta Shura (Taliban) for insecurity is almost negligible, totaling 6.5 percent of respondents.

Table 1: Who do you consider the most responsible for the violence that is occurring inside Afghanistan today?

N=200	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
Al-Qaeda and other Arab forces	34.0	36.0	35.0
Afghan National Government	4.0	6.0	5.0
Pakistan	22.0	46.0	34.0
United States	37.0	10.0	23.5
Quetta Shura	2.0	1.0	1.5
Afghan Police	0.0	0.0	0.0
Local Warlord	1.0	1.0	1.0

Security therefore remains a significant issue, and will continue to be, especially as ISAF forces continue to withdraw from this region.

Perceptions of the Afghan government, ISAF and the Taliban

The respondents' views of the main belligerents in the conflict -- ISAF, the Afghan government and the insurgents (most prominently in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban) -- suggest no side is winning over the population. Instead, a hurting stalemate seems to be evident, whereby the respondents resent any belligerents, and generally acquiesce to a group's presence rather than approve of them being in control. While the respondents seem to reject, or dislike, the perceived foreign interference in their country, this did not translate into support for the Afghan government, in part because there is also a perception, captured in other research, that the Karzai administration

Table 2. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion about each of the following:

Unfavorable views of...	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
Afghan Combatants			
Quetta Shura/Taliban (n=200)	71%	61%	66%
Quetta Shura/Taliban Fighters (n=189)	78.3%	70.1%	74.1%
Foreign States			
NATO/ISAF (n=195)	78.6%	57.7%	68.2%
US Government (n=198)	86%	65.3%	75.8%
US Military (n=200)	86%	68%	77%
Foreign Global Jihadists			
Al-Qaeda and Foreign Fighters (n=198)	93.9%	87.8%	90.8%

in particular is not independent from international actors and Karzai himself is tainted by foreign influence.³¹

Most respondents, upwards of two-thirds, do not view **any** of the belligerents favorably (see Table 2). If the population is the “prize” in counterinsurgency operations, to quote former Marine commander in southern Afghanistan Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson,³² all sides are failing. There is essentially very little difference in the respondents’ view of the Taliban and Quetta Shura on the one hand, and NATO/ISAF and U.S. forces on the other. It is important to stress that the vast majority of respondents, above and beyond those who are unfavorable of the Taliban and ISAF, are also unfavorable in their views about foreign fighters and global *jihadists*.

It is not necessarily true to assert that the Taliban would want to see global *jihadists* take a prominent role in the next phase of the conflict, as this may undermine their own support base (see below). It is, however, probable that individual Taliban sub-groups may choose to use extremist tactics, such as those of the Dadullah Mahaz in Kandahar³³ or Jaish-ul Mohammed in eastern Afghanistan, whose overlapping aims with global *jihadists* may be of concern to U.S. and international strategic interests.³⁴

The same general trends can be seen in the respondents’ views of individual leaders, with negative views of all foreign leaders, including President Obama (82 percent),³⁵

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran (84.8 percent)³⁶ and President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan (96 percent).³⁷

There were also very poor views of those who promoted global jihadist movements, such as Osama bin Laden (84.5 percent).³⁸ These results reflect the long-standing perception common in Afghanistan that foreign forces are the root of many, if not all problems, in the country.

Table 3: Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion about the Provincial government:

N=199	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
Very Favorable	6.0 %	19.2 %	12.6 %
Somewhat Favorable	23.0 %	40.4 %	31.7 %
Somewhat Unfavorable	41.0 %	25.3 %	33.2 %
Very Unfavorable	30.0 %	15.2 %	22.6 %

Table 3 shows that respondents held a mixed view about provincial governance, suggesting that not only are the main combat forces not winning over the population, but neither are the provincial governments in Helmand and Kandahar. This is despite substantial efforts to improve the standing of the government by both ISAF and the Afghan government by filling the approved *tashkil* (approved staffing list) in both provinces.³⁹ The respondents’ views of

the Afghan government at a national level were mixed, though generally positive, with more favorable views in

The mixed views of the civilian administration, both national and provincial, are contrasted with divergent views

Table 4. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion about each of the following:

	President Karzai n=200	Governor Mangal (Helmand only) n=100	Governor Wesa Toryalai (Kandahar only) n=99	Gulbuddin Hekmetyar (leader of Hizb-I Islami) n=184	Mullah Omar (leader of the Taliban) n=194
Very Favorable	33.5 %	16.0 %	3.0 %	28.3 %	15.5 %
Somewhat Favorable	35.0 %	38.0 %	20.2 %	29.3 %	17.0 %
Somewhat Unfavorable	19.5 %	24.0 %	37.4 %	14.1 %	23.7 %
Very Unfavorable	12.0 %	22.0 %	39.4 %	28.3 %	43.8 %

Helmand (65 percent very favorable, 23 percent somewhat favorable) and less positive opinions from the Kandahari respondents (12 percent very favorable, 44 percent somewhat favorable) implying the dissatisfaction noted above with regard to provincial governance is connected to the current government, rather than the national Afghan state.⁴⁰

In line with the respondents' perceptions about national and provincial government, there are mixed views from the respondents about Afghan government leaders

In line with the respondents' perceptions about national and provincial government, there are mixed views from the respondents about Afghan government leaders (see Table 4), including President Karzai, Helmand's Governor Mangal, and Kandahar Governor Wesa Toryalai. The apparent rejection of the Quetta Shura noted above is consistent with the leaders' attitudes towards that group's leader Mullah Omar, but the respondents' perception of Gulbuddin Hekmetyar (leader of the Hizb-I Islami insurgent group), is considerably more favorable.⁴¹

about the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army. The respondents had a generally negative view of the Afghan National Police (ANP), with 59 percent of Kandahari respondents and 30 percent of Helmandi respondents viewing them very unfavorably. Twenty one percent of Helmandi respondents and only 3 percent of Kandahari respondents viewed the police very favorably.⁴² This is likely the result of the differential use of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) deployments and the effects of the training center deploying re-trained ANP officers back to the field in Helmand.⁴³

These results are in contrast to those of other studies that suggest, based on random samples that do not focus on trust building with respondents, that the population trust the police. Several years and multiple sources of qualitative research and anecdotal evidence have suggested the opposite.⁴⁴ In contrast, the respondents' views of the Afghan National Army (ANA) were very positive, with 70.5 percent very favorable responses (61 percent among Kandahari respondents, compared to 80 percent among Helmandi respondents).⁴⁵ This is in line with other surveys, qualitative evidence and journalistic reports,⁴⁶ and suggests this survey presents a more nuanced representation of the respondents' views.

These findings highlight significant trends which underpin the current and future concerns of the respondents. Their

general dislike of any foreign actors and the mixed levels of trust in the civil administration represent a desire for independence which is coupled with concerns about governance in their areas. This is particularly acute with regard to the Afghan National Police, and while there is greater trust in the Afghan National Army, one institution does not a government make.

Respondents' Concerns

As summarized in Table 5, the respondents were deeply concerned about corruption (86 percent), lack of swift and impartial justice (73 percent), intimidation (69.3 percent) and the perceived under-representation of Pashtuns in government (71.9 percent). The first three have been common complaints about the Afghan administration for several years and -- despite attempts at training, capacity building and mentoring by international forces, which have individually had some impact -- the overall perception of the state is that it is deeply corrupt and lacks the moral force of the Taliban, which is demonstrated through Taliban justice systems which operate to varying degrees across both provinces.⁴⁷

The importance given by the respondents to the imbalance between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns in Kabul is interesting, and highlights one of the many tensions that any Afghan government would face in ensuring that all the major groups in Afghan society and politics have enough of a stake in the country.

The importance given by the respondents to the imbalance between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns in Kabul is interesting, and highlights one of the many tensions that any Afghan government would face in ensuring that all the major groups in Afghan society and politics have enough of a stake in the country. The allegations of corruption in both the presidential and parliamentary elections have, by most accounts, weakened the elected Pashtun leadership, which has struggled to resist being tainted by the violence and beliefs of the largely Pashtun Taliban. One obstacle to reconciliation perceived by several political blocs is that while the Taliban may be able to claim to represent Pashtun interests in some form, it would have to do so at the expense of other groups, including the Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek communities, due to its exclusive ideology.⁴⁸

Table 5: I am going to read you a list of possible claims some people make against the government in Kabul. Please tell me whether you think these problems are very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not at all important:

Very Important Issues (only)	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
Intimidation (n=199)	68.0	70.7	69.3
Corruption (n=200)	77.0	95.0	86.0
Imbalance Between Pashtuns/Other Groups in Government	55.0	88.9	71.9
Unable/Unwilling to Provide Swift/Impartial Justice	66.7	80.6	73.0

Table 6: I am going to read you a list of possible local grievances. Please tell me whether you think these problems are very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not at all important

Very Important Issues (Only)	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
Corrupt local leaders (n=199)	55.0 %	82.8 %	68.8 %
Kidnapping and organized crime (n=200)	76.0 %	68.0 %	72.0 %
Corruption in the Afghan National Police (n=200)	78.0 %	85.0 %	81.5 %
Lack of personal safety (n=200)	70.0 %	62.0 %	66.0 %
Economic issues			
Lack of jobs (n=200)	69.0 %	61.0 %	65.0 %
Poor roads and transportation (n=200)	60.0 %	91.0 %	75.5 %

Even when discussing their own local issues, the respondents repeated some of the same issues around corruption and criminality, which is a bigger problem in their eyes than the violent insurgency raging around them (see Table 6). It is important to stress that there is significant overlap between the concerns about corruption, behavior of the Afghan National Police and justice, because of consistent reporting of bribery and arbitrary detention by the ANP in both Kandahar and Helmand.⁴⁹ A common police approach is to arrest an individual, or small group, often on spurious grounds, and to detain them until their relatives or community comes to bribe the officers to release their kin. This is not just restricted to the ANP, and there have been reports that some Taliban and criminal groups have also carried out such acts.⁵⁰ These kinds of events are part of the culture of security enforcement in Afghanistan, and other evidence suggests, that despite a record of similar behavior, they often view the Taliban as representing a more moral force, which could constrain what they perceive as an abusive government.⁵¹ Therefore, addressing these issues is more than simply a technical issue to be addressed by “training” and “capacity building,” but one which must address the morality and work culture of the state and security forces (in particular the ANP) which are often perceived as being abusive.

Beyond the concerns around criminality and corruption, many of the respondents are also concerned about their economic wellbeing and the lack of jobs and poor road infrastructure.⁵² However, it is not as simple as creating

jobs through cash for work programs, because these are already happening. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has approved massive cash-for-work programs worth \$250 million in one year in both Helmand and Kandahar. In Nawa district in Helmand, this amounted to an allocation of \$400 per person where the per capita income is estimated at only \$300.⁵³ While not all the allocated funds could be spent because of insecurity, there were also concerns about the quality of work and monitoring of implementation.⁵⁴ The lack of oversight, appropriate monitoring and comprehension of the impacts of these programs remains very low, and the massive influx of money contributes to the very high levels of corruption that the respondents identified.⁵⁵

Therefore, while the respondents identified both economic and development needs, their biggest concerns were related to governance. Given the significant effort put into governance reform and filling *tashkils*, it is not clear that a technical approach will address the culture of governance, which is one where the respondents often feel threatened by the state.⁵⁶ The increases in expenditure may be contributing to the perception of rampant corruption among the respondents, and therefore continue to erode the remaining trust in the Afghan government. These are clearly challenges for the Afghan state, but they also represent challenges to the way the United States should interact with Afghanistan in the future.

Transition and the role of the United States

“Transition” denotes the process through which ISAF forces will move to non-combatant roles by the end of 2014, which started in Bamyan province on July 17.⁵⁷ Lashkar Gah was transitioned to Afghan security authority on July 20, 2011.⁵⁸ Yet the respondents’ views indicate that while the transition may be important for ISAF and the government, for many respondents it was not particularly relevant. The reality is that for many of the respondents doubt that transition will alter their lives greatly, because they already see the current conflict as the continuation of the civil war that started in 1989.

Thirty seven and a half percent of respondents believe Afghanistan is already in a civil war

Thirty seven and a half percent of respondents believe Afghanistan is already in a civil war,⁵⁹ and, further, many respondents believe the next civil war is almost certain to happen (19 percent) or more than likely (17 percent) (See Table 7). Taken together, 73.5 percent, or nearly three-quarters, of respondents are inclined to believe that violence in Afghanistan is going to continue in the form of a civil war. This has significant implications for transition, because it becomes clear that for many respondents, ISAF has been supporting one side in an ongoing civil war.

Table 7: How likely do you believe another civil war in Afghanistan could be over the next few years?

N=200	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
Almost Certain	23.0 %	15.0 %	19.0 %
More likely than not	18.0 %	17.0 %	17.5 %
Not likely but possible	5.0 %	15.0 %	10.0 %
Will not happen	15.0 %	17.0 %	16.0 %
Already a civil war	39.0 %	36.0 %	37.5 %

Transition

Given the generally negative view the respondents have of all foreign interference in their country, it would be easy to conclude that they also want troops to leave immediately, and for Afghanistan to be left to its own devices. This is, however, not the picture that emerges from the respondents, who are split between those who do want to see an immediate withdrawal of international forces (42 percent) and those concerned about the legitimacy and capability of the current Afghan government (38.5 percent) which links back to the fact that many respondents are more concerned about the high levels of corruption and injustice in this Afghan government than they are about the insurgency. The 2014 date for the end of combat operations is, to the respondents, largely irrelevant (See Table 8).

Table 8: When do you think foreign military forces (i.e., ISAF) should withdraw from Afghanistan?

N=200	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
Immediately	54.0	30.0	42.0
Next year	16.0	7.0	11.5
2014	9.0	6.0	7.5
After a legitimate and capable Afghan Government is in place?	21.0	56.0	38.5
Never	0.0	1.0	0.5

Table 9: I am going to read you a list of possible long-term goals for governing in your area. Please tell me whether you think these goals are very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not at all important:

Very Important Issues (Only)	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
U.S. business investment (n=199)	41.4 %	22.0 %	31.7 %
U.S. aid for school construction and teacher training (n=200)	40.0 %	64.0 %	52.0 %
U.S. aid for medical care and training (n=200)	42.0 %	41.0 %	41.5 %
U.S. military equipment and training to the Afghan National Army and Police (n=199)	69.0 %	57.0 %	63.0 %
U.S. increasing visas for Afghans to work or study in the United States (n=198)	30.0 %	22.0 %	26.0 %
Withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Afghanistan (n=196)	85.0 %	53.0 %	69.0 %
Increased U.S. effort to end Indian, Pakistani and Iranian intervention in Afghan politics. (n=200)	88.0 %	73.0 %	80.5 %
U.S. business investment (n=199)	41.4 %	22.0 %	31.7 %

Ultimately, when ISAF troops pull back, the respondents know that they will have to deal with the Afghan state, and the unfinished civil war between the Taliban and their opponents. As a result, the respondents have a complex understanding about how to address the governance issues in their areas, and as Table 9 indicates, defeating the Taliban is probably not their major priority (45.2 percent, ranked fifth in the table), or it at least comes below other priorities, including the withdrawal of foreign forces, addressing corruption and actually getting Afghan state governance to work. Additionally, respondents still feel strongly about keeping individuals viewed as warlords away from power.⁶⁰

Therefore while ISAF, the international community and in particular the United States shifts focus in Afghanistan, the priorities of the respondents seem to be fixed not on the security transition, but on governance. Over the last decade the international community has attempted, in various forms, to engage, support or reform Afghan governance systems. Much of that effort may have been wasted,⁶¹ but that does not mean walking away from those efforts entirely would be the most effective result, nor what the survey respondents would necessarily counsel.

The future role of the United States

Despite the consistent view across the respondents that they want foreign forces to leave, that they blame foreigners (of all types) for many of the problems associated with the conflict, this does not mean the respondents want to see ties with United States severed. In fact, they identify some very clear priorities for what they think the United States could constructively do.

Therefore while ISAF, the international community and in particular the United States shifts focus in Afghanistan, the priorities of the respondents seem to be fixed not on the security transition, but on governance

Table 10: Would any of the following improve your opinion of the United States?

A great deal (only):	Kandahar	Helmand	Average
U.S. business investment (n=199)	41.4	22.0	31.7
U.S. aid for school construction and teacher training (n=200)	40.0	64.0	52.0
U.S. aid for medical care and training (n=200)	42.0	41.0	41.5
U.S. military equipment and training to the Afghan National Army and Police (n=199)	69.0	57.0	63.0
U.S. increasing visas for Afghans to work or study in the United States (n=198)	30.0	22.0	26.0
Withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Afghanistan (n=196)	85.0	53.0	69.0
Increased U.S. effort to end Indian, Pakistani and Iranian intervention in Afghan politics. (n=200)	88.0	73.0	80.5

The most important issue the United States should focus on (83 percent, see Table 10), is addressing the interference of *other* states, in particular Pakistan, Iran and India, in Afghanistan's affairs. This is followed by two-thirds of respondents (69 percent) wanting to see the United States military leave Afghanistan, an almost equal proportion (63 percent) to those wanting U.S. training to continue for the ANA and ANP. These are complex views and represent pragmatic choices based on how the respondents view the conflict. Finally, about half of respondents would welcome U.S. civilian support in the sectors of education and health, though this support tails off for support in business development or supporting study or work visa programs in the United States.

In the respondents' eyes, the only country that can restrain Afghanistan's regional neighbors is the United States. They also recognize, as noted earlier, that their own government is corrupt and ineffective – in particular the Afghan National Police – and that, left alone, these issues are not going to be resolved quickly. Respondents also seem to want contradictory things, both withdrawal and further training of security forces. As is currently set out in the transition plan, training of ANSF will continue after 2014, and indeed it is seen as a critical issue for nearly two thirds of the respondents. These represent clear areas the United States could focus on in the run up to the ISAF transition and afterwards.

These are not new revelations, but suggest whatever the United States thinks it has achieved from its train-and-equip program, there is a long way to go to professionalize the police in particular so they are trusted by the population. Research from 2010 indicated that even respondents engaged in the insurgency do not necessarily want the United States to abandon Afghanistan, and that one of the most effective methods for U.S. engagement would be through the monitoring and enforcement of political agreements that could end the conflict and ensure that Afghanistan's porous borders are not open for global *jihadi* groups to cross to carry out attacks.⁶²

Conclusion

The research carried out in Kandahar and Helmand in March 2011 indicates that the impending transition of ISAF forces from a combat to non-combatant training role after 2014 will reveal that neither the Afghan government nor insurgency can claim to have won solid support from the population. And most respondents feel that the transition of ISAF forces will unleash a number of competing tensions in Afghan society and governance which need to be acknowledged and addressed for the population to gradually feel secure and engaged by their political leaders. The survey confirms that there is general resentment among the respondents to all foreign actors believed to be interfering in Afghanistan's affairs. This likely confirms the argument that ongoing combat by foreign forces is likely

only to increase resistance, not just to ISAF, but to the state as well. Transition may therefore be the only viable course of action left that enables ISAF to retain a residue of support for the Afghan state, while not engaging in combat and not fully withdrawing. Respondents are also deeply critical of neighboring states **and** global *jihadists*, who they perceive as major belligerents in the conflict.

The criticism of foreign actors does not, however, lead to substantial support for the Afghan state, even in urban areas, because of unresolved governance issues. Chief among these is the threat that the state itself has posed, and will continue to pose, to its citizens because of intimidation, arbitrary detention, bribery and corruption. Equally, respondents are not particularly supportive of the Taliban; they seem instead to be split between the state and the insurgents, still waiting to see who will win the upper hand. Instead, the respondents' concerns focus on securing a stable governance arrangement where they are not threatened, are able to earn a living, and can live their lives in relative peace. The respondents identified three key areas where the United States in particular can play a constructive role once the transition is achieved.

To this end, the New America Foundation and Peace Training Research Organisation recommend that the US focus on:

- 1) To curtail the influence of neighboring states in Afghanistan;
 - a. Revisit and strengthen the provisions of previous international agreements in Afghanistan, in particular, the Kabul Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations signed by the Transitional Administration of Afghanistan and the governments of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in December 2002;
 - b. Use the reconvening of the Bonn conference in December 2011 to, at best, establish a potential peace process and, as a minimum, set clear boundaries about

the unacceptability of links between the Afghan government, insurgents and global *jihadist* groups for the international community.

- 2) Continue to train and professionalize the ANSF, in particular the police;
 - a. Shift the focus of training from basic survival and combat training to longer-term, deeper issues around corruption, treatment of civilians and human rights;
 - b. Communicate clearly that training by the United States focus on these issues because they are about protecting the Afghan population, rather than purely military objectives;
 - c. Reassess the scale of the train-and-equip program, which grossly outstrips the fiscal capacity of the Afghan state to sustain it.
- 3) It is also important that U.S. development programming re-emerge as a civilian-led program, dictated by development priorities rather than military strategy;
 - a. Development spending in specific sectors, such as education and health, would be welcome and should continue;
 - b. Expenditure needs to be gradually scaled back after years of excess spending, which has contributed to the culture of corruption plaguing Afghanistan.

¹ There are no academic sources on social desirability in Afghanistan, but it has been known for some time that different societies have different levels of social desirability in responses to questionnaires, and this weakens comparisons of surveys across countries, see for example, Heath, A. et al, 2005, The globalisation of public opinion research, Working Paper, Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends, Department of Sociology, Oxford University, UK

² Smith, G., "Many in Kandahar fear looming disaster as Canada withdraws," Globe and Mail July 9, 2011

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/many-in-kandahar-fear-looming-disaster-as-canada->

[withdraws/article2092248/singlepage/#articlecontent](#) accessed July 10, 2011.

³ Including; Achickzai (19), Alikozai (28), Alizai (26), Barakzai (24), Ishaqzai (11), Noorzai (31), Popalzai (22)

⁴ Including; Ahmadzai, Hotak, Kakar, Kharoti, Khawajogan, Ludin, Mohmand, Nasar, Niazi, Shirzai, Stanekzai, Tokhi, Wardak.

⁵ Including; Baluch, Hazara, Mullah Shadi Khail, Ratman Zayee, Safai, Sayed, Tarin

⁶ CIA World Factbook, 2011, Afghanistan, updated July 5, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> accessed July 10, 2011

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Garmsir, Kajaki, Marja, Musa Qala, Nad-I Ali, Nahr-I Sarraj, Nawa-I Barakzai, Nawzad and Sangin.

¹⁰ A 2008 estimate gives an unemployment rate of 35 percent. CIA World Factbook, Afghanistan, updated July 5, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> accessed July 10, 2011

¹¹ There are no public figures giving force levels in Kandahar province, though in Helmand it has been confirmed there are 30,000 ISAF forces and approximately 30,000 ANSF. In Kandahar a significant proportion of surge forces have been deployed, alongside the Canadian deployment in Kandahar which completed in July 2011. See Adm Stavridis, A Few Days in Afghanistan, Jan. 31, 2011, USEUCOM <https://useucom.wordpress.com/tag/helmand-province/> accessed July 12, 2011. Carl Forsberg, Counterinsurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 Hamkari Campaign, Afghanistan Report 7, December 2010, Institute for the Study of War, Washington DC, United States.

¹² Interview with NATO official, Dec. 9, 2010

¹³ Cooperation

¹⁴ Information held by PTRO relating to Kandahar, tactics in 2010 included attacking small numbers of policemen in outlying checkpoints.

¹⁵ Bill Roggio, Suicide bomber assassinates Kandahar police chief, April 15, 2011 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/04/suicide_bomber_assas_1.php accessed July 8th 2011

¹⁶ The "escape" may have actually been an inside job, either way nearly 500 Taliban combatants got out. Jean MacKenzie, "Was Afghanistan's 'Great Escape' actually a great big sham?" May 5, 2011

<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/dispatches-afghanistan/was-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%99Cgreat-escape%E2%80%9D-actually-great-b> accessed July 8, 2011

¹⁷ Jon Boone, "Taliban launch multi-pronged attack on city of Kandahar," May 8, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/taliban-launch-attack-kandahar-city> accessed July 8, 2011

¹⁸ BBC, "Afghan president's brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, killed," July 12, 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14118884> accessed July 12, 2011

¹⁹ Q1 n=200

²⁰ In Helmand 27 percent thought it was the same; 18 percent thought it was better

²¹ Q3 n=200

²² Smith, G. "Many in Kandahar fear looming disaster as Canada withdraws," Globe and Mail, July 9, 2011

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/many-in-kandahar-fear-looming-disaster-as-canada-withdraws/article2092248/singlepage/#articlecontent> accessed July 10, 2011.

²³ Q3 subset, n=43

²⁴ Q16 n=199

²⁵ Forsberg, pp.6-7.

²⁶ ANSO, ANSO Quarterly Data Report Quarter 1, 2011, Kabul, Afghanistan.

²⁷ Q7abc n=200

²⁸ UN News Centre, "Afghan civilian deaths rise, insurgents responsible for most casualties," July 14, 2011, available at

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39036&Cr=Afghan&Cr1=> accessed July 18, 2011. For figures in 2010, again according to the UN, insurgents caused three-quarters of the 2,777 civilian deaths in Afghanistan in 2010, and ISAF caused 16 percent of fatalities, a reduction of 27 percent since 2009. UN News Centre, March 9, 2011, "Citing rising death toll, UN urges better protection of Afghan civilians," <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37715&Cr=Afghan&Cr1> accessed July 8, 2011

²⁹ Information held by PTRO and UN News Centre, "Afghan civilian deaths rise, insurgents responsible for most casualties" July 14, 2011, available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39036&Cr=Afghan&Cr1=> accessed July 18, 2011.

³⁰ Q8a n=200 c n=199 f n=187 13 respondents in Kandahar did not answer Q8f, the percentage for Kandahar and overall total is based on a sample of n=87

³¹ Information held by PTRO, this is also believed to be behind President Karzai's posturing over his relationship with ISAF.

³² Dexter Filkins, "Afghan Offensive is New War Model," The New York Times, February 12, 2010.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/world/asia/13kabul.html>

³³ The Mullah Dadullah Mahaz allegedly orchestrated the suicide attack that killed the Kandahar chief of police in April, 2011. Bill Roggio, "Suicide bomber assassinates Kandahar police chief," April 15, 2011

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/04/suicide_bomber_assas_1.php accessed July 8, 2011.

³⁴ There has been recent fighting in Nuristan allegedly involving Jaish-ul Muhammad, reportedly a Punjabi jihadist group. See Cavendish, J., "First, Take Nuristan: The Taliban's New Afghan Plan," June 1, 2011, TIME Magazine,

<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2074910,00.html> accessed July 10, 2011. And for background of their activities see Moore, M and

Russell, J., "Kunar and Nuristan: Rethinking U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations," Institute for the Study of War, Washington D.C., United States, available at

http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Afghanistan_Report_1.pdf accessed July 10, 2011.

³⁵ Q5b n=195

³⁶ Q5n n=198

³⁷ Q5o n=199

³⁸ Q5l n=194 Note the survey was carried out before Osama bin Laden was killed on May 2, 2011.

³⁹ Information held by PTRO and interview with ISAF official Nov. 27, 2011.

⁴⁰ Q4a n=200

⁴¹ Interview with a leader of Hizb-I Islami, Dec. 12, 2010.

⁴² Q4c n=200

⁴³ Information held by PTRO.

⁴⁴ Information held by PTRO. This contrasts with the findings of the Asia Foundation Survey of the Afghan People 2010, which states 79 percent of their respondents nationwide had "some confidence" in the ANP, the equivalent figure in the NAF survey is 32.5 percent of the respondents have a very favorable or somewhat favorable view of the ANP. This drops to 10

percent among Kandahari respondents. The Asia Foundation, 2010, p.69, "Afghanistan in 2010, A Survey of the Afghan People," Kabul, Afghanistan.

⁴⁵ Q4b n=200

⁴⁶ The TAF scores on trust in the Afghan National Army are 91 percent of respondents stating a fair amount or a great deal of confidence; in the NAF survey this was 93.5 percent of the respondents have a very favorable or somewhat favorable view of the ANA. Ibid, p.69

⁴⁷ Information held by PTRO

⁴⁸ A rally was held in Kabul on May 5, apparently attracting 10,000 people.

Jon Boone, "Afghans protest against Taliban peace deal," May 5, 2011,

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/05/afghans-protest-taliban-peace-deal> accessed July 8, 2011. For further discussion also see Ruttig and

Hewad, "The Green Trend mobilisation and a possible new rift in Jamiat," May 18, 2011, <http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1725> accessed July 8, 2011.

⁴⁹ Information held by PTRO

⁵⁰ Information held by PTRO relating to Helmand.

⁵¹ Information held by authors relating to Helmand, Kandahar,

⁵² Thirty six percent of the sample described themselves as being unemployed, and a further 20 percent part-time employed

⁵³ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, 112th Congress, 1st session, 2011, p.11. June 8, 2011, Washington D.C., United States.

⁵⁴ One of the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture initiatives is implemented by IRD. The program's audit raised concerns about the level of spending as the result of insecurity, and that "Efforts to initiate activities were also hampered by the high level of corruption within the local government" which complicated implementation. Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture (AVIPA) Program, Audit report No 5-306-10-008-P APRIL 20, 2010, p.10, Manila, Philippines. Also see the implementing partners' statement following a critical article by Rajiv Chandrasekaran in The Washington Post. *IRD Responds to Washington Post Story Entitled: "U.S. Military Dismayed by Delays in 3 Key Development Projects"* April 29, 2011, Arlington, Virginia, U.S., available at http://www.ird.org/what/stories/us_WashingtonPostRebuttal_4-29-11.html accessed July 10, 2011.

⁵⁵ Information held by PTRO

⁵⁶ U.S. State Department, slide 22, “How do we know whether development programs contribute to stabilization?” Department of State Annual Conference on Program Evaluation, June 7-8, 2011, George C. Marshall Center, available at <https://www.conferences.state.gov/RM/programevaluation2011/Related%20Documents/Development%20Workshops/How%20Do%20We%20Know%20Whether%20Development%20Programs.pdf>, accessed July 8, 2011

⁵⁷ Shalizi, H., “Afghan security transition to start in seven areas,” Reuters, March 22, 2011 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/22/us-afghanistan-transition-idUSTRE72L15C20110322> accessed July 12, 2011, and BBC, “David Petraeus hands over Afghanistan command,” July 18, 2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14181299> accessed July 18, 2011

⁵⁸ BBC, “Lashkar Gah: Nato hands over volatile Afghan city,” available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14206060> accessed July 20, 2011.

⁵⁹ A point not lost on many researchers and analysts over the last 10 years is that the Bonn Agreement was a victors’ pact which excluded at least one legitimate political faction – the Taliban – and therefore the Karzai administration has overseen the extension of the civil war that emerged at the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989.

⁶⁰ This is reflective of long-standing demands from various sections of the Afghan population; a study in 2004 argued that 88 percent of respondents to that survey wanted “the government to act to reduce the powers of commanders.” Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, “Take the Guns Away,” p.2, HRRAC, Kabul, Afghanistan. Available at <http://www.afghanadvocacy.org.af/englishweb/Data/Reports/TaketheGunsAwayEnglish.pdf> accessed July 10, 2011.

⁶¹ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, p.11, June 8, 2011, Washington, D.C., United States.

⁶² Information held by PTRO, data collected in Helmand and Kandahar in April and May 2010



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