Paramilitary Paper Trails: Mapping the Wagner Group’s Ties to Russia with Personnel Data

• With 13,136 personnel records, the Wagner Group personnel dataset offers unparalleled visibility into Wagner Group’s inner workings, providing a comprehensive view of its command structure, operational culture, and extensive deployment patterns across conflict zones. This dataset is an invaluable tool for accountability efforts, enabling investigators to trace decision-making roles and pinpoint commanders implicated in suspected and documented war crimes.
• Crucially, the dataset also highlights the close ties between Wagner and Russian state institutions, suggesting the potential for state responsibility under international law. The involvement of Russian government agencies—evidenced by state-awarded medals, false identities, and logistical support—raises serious questions about the state’s role in facilitating or directing Wagner’s actions.
• Wagner’s structure was not that of a standard private military company but rather mirrored a military formation modeled after an Airborne special-purpose (spetsnaz) brigade. Its core leadership comprised veterans of the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence), VDV (Airborne Forces), and MVD (Internal Affairs), bringing with them the organizational culture and capabilities of elite military units.
• The presence of specialized roles within Wagner’s ranks—such as tank drivers, anti-aircraft missile specialists, and artillery personnel—indicates that Wagner was not just a paramilitary force but operated in sync with broader Russian military interests, often utilizing equipment supplied by the state-controlled arms export agency Rosoboronexport.
• In thousands of instances, individual fighters can be traced to specific Russian-made weapons platforms. The dataset contains detailed information about the types of weapons platforms Wagner deployed, many of which were produced for export by Rostec, a Russian state-owned defense conglomerate, for specific foreign clients. This detail adds weight to the evidence of strategic coordination between Wagner’s paramilitary activities and Russian state-controlled entities.
• This organizational model, combined with the complex strategic objectives set by the Kremlin and the GRU, positioned Wagner as a direct instrument of Russian foreign policy, functioning much like an extension of the state. Under international criminal law, individual members of corporate entities, including state-owned enterprises like Rosoboronexport, can be held liable if, for instance, they knowingly assisted or facilitated war crimes.

Behind every military campaign is an intricate network of administration, logistics, and personnel. In the case of the Wagner Group, these hidden operational details are coming to light through leaked personnel files: 164 documents obtained by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) and collated and analyzed by New America’s Future Frontlines program. Viewed individually, each file offers fragments—like call signs, casualty reports, or military commendations—but the true value of these documents emerges when cross-referenced and analyzed collectively. To this end, Future Frontlines developed an automated process to clean, structure, and merge the files based on verified matching data points. The result: a dataset of 13,136 personnel records, the most comprehensive dataset of Wagner Group personnel yet assembled. It offers a unique window into the organization’s command hierarchy, structure, operational culture, and, crucially, links to the state.

The files, which spanned from 2014 to 2021, varied dramatically. Some, like a handwritten list of recommendations for one of Russia’s highest awards, contained only a few names but revealed the group’s ideological leanings, with chief field commander Dmitry Utkin’s trademark “SS” of the Nazi Schutzstaffel scrawled across the top. Others cataloged thousands of individuals, spanning the Wagner workforce from senior commanders to junior squad members and drivers. These records meticulously detail birthdates, false identities, join dates, awards, casualties, units, and deployments—critical bookkeeping for managing an operation of this scale across multiple continents.

Our analysis unveils the inner workings of a covert military enterprise, revealing an organization with a structure that continually evolved, one that offered ambitious recruits ample opportunity for advancement. Injury reports and medal citations paint a picture of frequent casualties in both offensive operations and security assignments—evidence that the Wagner Group wielded essentially military capabilities, far beyond the limited security scope of most private military companies.

In addition, the dataset reveals extensive use of false identities. Nearly 6,000 personnel records connect to aliases, indicating the elaborate lengths taken to obscure Wagner’s activities. These movements, from Russia to Syria and across Africa, were accompanied by a high level of coordination and casualties, demonstrating that Wagner wielded military capabilities on par with formal state forces. The sheer scale of awards and casualties, alongside the use of military-grade platforms, underscores the militarized nature of Wagner’s operations, reflecting a command hierarchy akin to a state-run special purpose military formation.

The dataset, while extensive, nonetheless offers an incomplete picture. Additional personnel records have surfaced during our research that have yet to be integrated into the dataset. Many personnel entries remain sparse, drawing from only one or two source documents. Despite rigorous efforts to eliminate duplicates, some likely remain. Much of the qualitative data remains in its original Russian. Analysts and policymakers should approach the dataset with an awareness of these gaps and limitations.

Wagner was formed in the mold of an Airborne special purpose (spetsnaz) brigade, and traces of those origins can be seen in its unit structure, operational capabilities, and internal terminology. The organization’s composition closely mirrored that of a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) brigade, from assault units to support elements. Internal documents reveal that Wagner personnel often referred to their organization as a “brigade” and to Dmitry Utkin, who was a veteran of Russia’s Second Guards Separate Special Purpose Brigade, as the “brigade commander.”

A high level of hierarchical distribution of tasks and roles as well as capabilities made Wagner akin to an army rather than a standard private military company. That model reflects both the leadership culture that spetsnaz paratroopers and GRU operatives imbued the organization with and the complex objectives the Kremlin and the GRU sought to achieve, using Wagner as a proxy.

Commanders

Of all the job titles, commanders were the most numerous and accounted for 15 percent of the positions in the dataset, reflecting the organization’s hierarchical structure. Within Wagner, the term “commander” referred to anyone in charge of a unit, regardless of its size or position in the hierarchy. For example, an assault detachment consisted of three assault platoons, a fire support platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, an armored group, a medical group, a sniper section, and a transport group. Each of these units had a commander, and many also had a deputy commander. Furthermore, each assault platoon contained three assault squads and a fire support squad, again each with their own commanders. This nested command structure accounts for the prevalence of command roles in the dataset.

Wagner Group personnel often rotated between positions. For instance, Anton “Lotus” Yelizarov, one of Wagner’s most visible and well-known field commanders, rotated from an assault detachment commander position to a deputy commander for combat training on more than one occasion. To explore the full structure of the Wagner Group’s paramilitary wing as of September 2021, see our interactive visualization.

Assault Detachments

Assault detachments (штурмовые отряды) served as Wagner’s primary fighting units, operating across Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic. These units evolved from the “reconnaissance assault companies” deployed during the initial phase of the Donbas conflict in 2014–2015. Each of those units was composed of 93 to 103 men. Staff job books with later dates indicate that over time, the standard unit size would bulk up to 303 billets, but detachments often operated below full strength. At any given time, the total number of Wagner personnel deployed to a particular country could reach as high as 2,500 or more, depending on circumstances.

Staff sometimes rotated between detachments, and detachments themselves were typically deployed across different theaters of conflict. Future Frontlines’s cross-referencing of assault detachment assignments with location data showed that a single detachment could have personnel simultaneously working in several countries.

Of Wagner’s personnel, 4,281 (33 percent) were assigned to a single assault detachment, while 477 (4 percent) received multiple assault detachment assignments over time. By mid-2021, Wagner had built up nine assault detachments and was just starting to build its 10th and 11th as the paramilitary expanded its operations to Mali. Wagner also created smaller ad hoc formations in specific areas of operation that were sometimes named after their commander’s call sign, such as the “Chinese” group that may have operated under the command of Vladimir “Chinese” Kitaev in the Central African Republic. (Another possible commander for the group was Sergei Nikolaevich Mironov, who used the same call sign.)

Security and Intelligence

A sizable number of billets were allotted to operational security and intelligence, comprising 12 percent of the positions in the dataset. This reflected the considerable resources Wagner devoted to operational security, a mechanism in place since the organization’s inception. Internal documents reveal that by December 2014, Wagner maintained a 12-person intelligence unit and a 122-person security team, both reporting directly to Wagner Group chief of staff and director Andrei Troshev.

These personnel investigated and documented breaches of protocol, from on-duty intoxication to unauthorized use of social media and communications devices. In one notable instance, the security department produced detailed reports investigating the on-camera 2017 torture and murder of Syrian national Muhammad Taha Abdullah al-Ismail (also known as Hamdi Bouta)—not because of the crime itself, but because footage had been posted on the internet. Intelligence officers provided critical operational intelligence, possibly compensating for the organization’s relative lack of access to high-tech signals and satellite intelligence available to regular military forces. This role was particularly crucial in the initial stages of Wagner’s evolution, when the group was likely still developing its capabilities and networks.

Diverse Military Specializations

Drivers, the third largest category after commanders and security/intelligence personnel, comprised 12 percent of fighters. This category included tank drivers, personnel carrier operators, anti-aircraft battery drivers, and depot truck drivers, all supporting Wagner’s transport and logistics needs across varied terrains. Riflemen, machine gunners, snipers, and artillery and grenade units constituted the majority of assault detachment roles.

The dataset reveals Wagner personnel ranged from tank drivers to anti-aircraft missile battery specialists, reflecting the organization’s deep integration with client states’ military needs. The diversity of roles and types of weaponry points to a close relationship with Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state-controlled arms export agency.

Recruitment

The dataset has information on when fighters joined Wagner for about one quarter of individuals. A histogram of join dates reflects Wagner’s recruitment push to prepare for deployment to Syria in 2015–2016 and then their global expansion to Africa in 2017–2018, when they entered the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Libya.

Both the average and median age of Wagner personnel in the dataset is 42.5 years. This aligns with our understanding that the organization recruited out of Russia’s retired, or imprisoned, military ranks. As a result, their fighters skewed more middle-aged, having already served a career in the traditional military.

The pattern of medals awarded, the use of fake identities, and the high number of casualties across multiple conflict zones demonstrate direct Russian government support for the Wagner Group from its inception in 2014 to its collapse in 2023. The presence of specialized roles within Wagner’s ranks—such as tank drivers, anti-aircraft missile specialists, and artillery personnel—further demonstrates that Wagner operated not just as a paramilitary force but as a unit working in tandem with broader Russian military interests.

Moreover, Wagner’s use of equipment from Russia’s state-controlled arms export agency Rosoboronexport and the state arms conglomerate Rostec strongly suggests operational coordination with the Kremlin. These factors are critical when evaluating Wagner’s relationship with the Russian state, particularly under international law’s effective control test, which assesses whether the state exercised control over a non-state actor’s operations.

Taken together, this evidence could bear significant weight in evaluating the Russian state’s responsibility for alleged atrocities committed by Wagner personnel in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. The direct provision of weapons, the specialized roles of Wagner operatives, and the seamless integration with Russian military logistics point to a high degree of state involvement, implicating the Kremlin in Wagner’s operations from start to finish.

These factors may be relevant to determining whether the state was complicit in acts that violated international law. But it is important to note that there is debate about whether and when states can be held responsible if they aid non-state actors in the commission of crimes. However, there is little question that the evidence extant in the personnel dataset is relevant to assessing whether individual actors could be held criminally liable for their actions in support of the Wagner Group.

Medals and Casualties

The prevalence of high-level awards, particularly the Medal “For Courage” (Медаль «За отвагу»), which 12 percent of personnel in the dataset received, suggests the Russian government readily honored Wagner Group members for their service and sacrifice. Fully 18 percent of personnel in the dataset, or 2,421 individual fighters, received 3,002 medals between 2014 and mid-2021, most conferred by the presidential Commission on State Awards. Of the decorated personnel, 473 fighters received multiple medals.

The Order of Courage (Орден Мужества), recognizing acts of bravery in perilous situations, constitutes 27 percent of the awards. Another 18 percent comprises the Medal of the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland” (Орден «За заслуги перед Отечеством»), a hybrid military-civilian decoration acknowledging substantial contributions to national defense. Its variant “with Swords” (с мечами) specifically honors combat achievements. Other accolades highlight valor in particular conflict zones, such as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” awards, which collectively account for approximately 2 percent of the total distinctions.

While these awards provide insight into the Wagner Group’s activities and the Russian government’s recognition of their efforts, they also point to significant personnel costs. The dataset contains incomplete and inconsistent information on casualties, categorizing 1,018 as “wounded” and 206 as “dead.” These figures likely underestimate the true toll between 2014 and mid-2021, given the number of medals awarded and the sparse nature of injury information. Russia often relied on Wagner personnel to carry out high-risk and specialized operations without commensurate training or experience, resulting in high casualties.

False Identities

In June 2019, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that a single passport assignment desk within the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, previously suspected of supplying fake passports to military intelligence officers, issued fake passports to Wagner personnel. This connection between a state agency and Wagner’s operations points to a closely coordinating degree of official Russian involvement. The SBU released the names and details of 16 Wagner fighters they suspected of receiving fake passports. Of these 16 fighters, 11 are found within the dataset, nine of whom are assigned “clone” (“клон”) names and birthdates by Wagner’s then-human resources head, Vadim Pavlovich Suvorov, more commonly known by his call sign Crystal (Хрусталь).

A review of the list indicates that 5,832 personnel, or 44 percent of the total dataset, were assigned fake identities. While it is not clear whether all these personnel also received fake passports, the overlap with the SBU’s list is significant. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported that Suvorov left Wagner in late 2023 to work for Redut, a military intelligence-run front for irregular recruitment. Open sources indicate that Suvorov used his database of Wagner fighters to poach recruits for Redut. It is possible that these identities may have been reused or recycled in some way during Suvorov’s transition from Wagner to Redut.

Equipment

In thousands of instances in the dataset, individual fighters can be traced directly to the types of Russian-made weapons platforms Wagner operated in the field. For example, Wagner’s use of Pantsir anti-aircraft missile systems in Libya during the 2019 Tripoli offensive led by Khalifa Haftar’s forces has been well documented via analysis of satellite imagery, media reporting, customs records, military-technical agreements, and social media data. The personnel dataset further confirms that Wagner assigned at least 300 individuals to Pantsir-S crews in Libya.

The list of weapons platforms reads like a Rostec catalog for a military exposition sales conference. It includes everything from Grad missile launchers to Orlan-10 reconnaissance drones manufactured exclusively by the Special Technology Center in St. Petersburg. The fact that these operatives were deployed with advanced Russian weaponry, often manufactured by the state arms maker Rostec and exported under Rosoboronexport’s exclusive contracts, like Pantsir anti-aircraft systems, Grad missile launchers, and Orlan-10 drones, suggests more than a simple transactional relationship. Instead, it points to an operational nexus where Wagner’s actions may have been facilitated and guided by state-owned entities.

Comprehensive analysis of personnel records provides a robust view of the command structure of the Wagner group and pierces the veil of Kremlin obfuscation, revealing the complex mix of state interests that the Wagner Group served. Staffing patterns, equipment, commendations, and government-enabled distribution of fake identities point to significant state involvement in shaping and coordinating Wagner operations.

When considering questions of state responsibility for suspected Wagner atrocities and breaches of law, there are several challenges, as noted in a November 2023 Open Society Justice Initiative and Renaissance Foundation study. One pertains to determining the relationship between the Russian state and Wagner forces. Legal precedents like Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ) emphasize that effective control can be established even if direct evidence is lacking, relying on circumstantial evidence and patterns of behavior. A State party to a conflict can be said to have effective control of forces if, in addition to organizing, coordinating, or planning the military actions of the military group and financing, training, and equipping or providing operational support to that group, there is proof that the State gave the non-State armed group direct orders or instructions for them to commit international crimes.

Much of the contemporary legal analysis on the relationship between the Wagner Group and the Russian state has been predicated on the assumption that forces managed by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s array of shell companies served the beneficial interests of a private military security company. Yet the Wagner Group was never formed as a unitary enterprise; it was not registered as a corporate entity. Instead, a network of firms hired individual Wagner fighters on contract to service both foreign clients in the Middle East and Africa while often simultaneously providing services to Russian state enterprises or privately held Russian companies deemed under Russian national law as “strategic enterprises” due to their activities in the energy or arms sector.

One of those companies was the state-controlled arms conglomerate, Rostec, and its export arm, Rosoboronexport. However, to date, there has been little exploration of the legal implications of the fact pattern pointing to close coordination between state-controlled entities such as Rosoboronexport and Wagner Group forces. Instead, much of the legal debate has been predicated on the assumption that the GRU military intelligence wing was the sole or primary locus of coordination between the state and Wagner forces, particularly in the context of the 2022 phase of Russia’s incursion in Ukraine. But the fact pattern that emerges from analyses of the Wagner personnel dataset suggests that Rosoboronexport likely also played a significant role in organizing and coordinating the actions of the Wagner Group.

As part of the Rostec state corporation, Rosoboronexport serves as the sole official intermediary for Russia’s export and import of military and dual-use products and technologies. Rosoboronexport’s export of highly sensitive military technologies—such as missile systems, air defense systems, and advanced combat aircraft—often requires direct involvement from the Ministry of Defense. These decisions are tightly controlled by the ministry to ensure that such technologies do not fall into the hands of adversaries or countries that could pose a future threat to Russian security.

Significantly, a separate analysis of metadata on several leaked documents surfaced indications that memos pertaining to Wagner operations addressed to Kremlin and defense ministry officials may have been prepared on government-issued devices from the State Agency for Federal Property Management (Rosimushchestvo). The agency is responsible for overseeing and managing the state’s assets, which include shares in state-owned federal unitary enterprises like Rostec. Rosimushchestvo often acts as a steward of the government’s holdings in strategic sectors such as defense, energy, and infrastructure. Rostec, as a state corporation, falls under this category since it was created to manage and develop Russia’s defense and high-tech industries.

The connection between Rosoboronexport and Wagner’s actions also raises questions about the individual liability of officials within both Wagner and Rosoboronexport as well as the defense ministry. In addition to other theories of criminal responsibility like co-perpetration or complicity, international criminal law recognizes the principle of command responsibility, under which individuals with effective control over their subordinates can be held accountable if they knew or should have known about crimes being committed by their subordinates and failed to prevent or punish those actions. This could apply to individuals overseeing arms transfers, logistical support, or operations.

In addition to supporting efforts to hold the state responsible, this may permit investigations to hold individuals criminally accountable for international crimes committed by Wagner. Under international criminal law, particularly in cases involving aiding and abetting war crimes, attempts by state actors or corporate leaders to obscure their control do not eliminate potential liability. If state actors have engaged in systematic efforts to obscure Rosoboronexport’s control over Wagner, it does not shield them or corporate actors from investigation.

Moreover, if Wagner forces were using military-grade equipment typically reserved for state actors and were receiving the training and logistics to operate such platforms, this potentially supports the notion of Rosoboronexport’s substantial role in their operations. This level of integration also raises potential questions about state responsibility under international law, particularly if the Russian state, through Rosoboronexport, knowingly supplied equipment used in operations involving war crimes.

Although the standards of proof for establishing that the state held effective control over non-state actors is high, the patterns found in the personnel dataset warrant further investigation into whether there is evidence that individuals affiliated with the state issued specific instructions or directions related to Wagner’s operations. In fact, a review of leaked internal correspondence and documents from Evro Polis LLC, the Russian company that was central to much of the paramilitary’s administration, revealed that Prigozhin and other Wagner leaders worked under the assumption that they operated under orders from the Kremlin.

For example, in one 2018 document, Prigozhin claimed in a letter addressed to then defense minister Sergey Shoigu that he had received from Vladimir Putin a “secret directive about the purchase” of a fleet of ships “on behalf of the ministry of defense” in order to facilitate the movement of cargo from Russia to Syria. In the memo, Prigozhin also noted that the ships in question had since been absorbed into the auxiliary fleet of the Russian navy. The Wagner Group’s leading role in the transfer of weapons from Russia to Syria via the so-called “Syrian Express” has been well-documented. A cursory check of the public records of specific ship transit routes and sightings of the ships carrying Russian military cargo through the Turkish straits and other shipping channels indicates that the ships in question likely carried cargo for Rosoboronexport.

Although the direct relationship between Wagner and Rosoboronexport may not always be transparent, the evidence of consistent military provisioning and the nature of the weapons used paints a clearer picture of overall state control and corporate complicity. This bolsters the evidence pointing to coordination at the highest levels of government and raises concerns about the criminal responsibility of individual corporate actors, particularly if Rosoboronexport’s involvement extends beyond mere exports to actual strategic guidance or support for Wagner’s global operations. In certain jurisdictions, the evidence may also raise questions about the civil responsibility of corporations.

This analysis represents only a sample of the insights that could be gleaned from the Wagner Group personnel dataset. Further research could yield other useful patterns and help establish a fact base to advance accountability for the alleged atrocity crimes committed by Wagner forces. For example, cross-referencing the medals and orders listed in the dataset with official Russian governmental records of awardees could provide concrete evidence of state backing for this ostensibly private paramilitary organization.

Researchers should note that the dataset draws on records that conclude around September 2021, six months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Subsequent events significantly altered Wagner’s composition and scale. During the capture of Bakhmut, for example, Wagner’s ranks swelled to tens of thousands due to aggressive recruiting in Russian prisons. The number of assault detachments also expanded beyond the 11 present in the dataset, with some reports in early 2024 suggesting as many as 17 such units. Moreover, Wagner’s deployment to Mali only began in earnest in late 2021, so data from that operation is largely absent from our analysis. Despite these limitations, the more than 13,000 entries in our dataset broadly align with estimates of an organization that, in 2021, comprised between 4,000 and 5,000 personnel and had been operational for seven years.

We hope this dataset proves valuable to other researchers and investigators seeking to build the brief on the Wagner Group in both the pre- and post-Prigozhin era. Due to the substantial amount of personally identifying information contained within, we have chosen not to publish the dataset in its entirety. However, qualified researchers may apply for viewing access and a copy of the full technical report.