Afghanistan's Aftershocks

The Taliban's August 2021 return to power in Afghanistan represented a seismic shift in the country's governance with implications for regional and global security. It positioned Afghanistan as a central hub for terrorism, empowering a range of terrorist organizations, most notably the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which, along with other groups, found refuge and operational latitude within Afghanistan's borders.

The return of Afghanistan as a central hub for international terrorism is the culmination of several intertwined factors, including diplomatic engagements like the Doha peace process, regional and global geopolitical maneuvers, and the Taliban’s deft approach to forming alliances with a range of terrorist groups. These elements collectively facilitated Afghanistan's emergence as a sanctuary for terrorism, raising urgent questions about the efficacy of international counterterrorism strategies and the future of regional security. This essay seeks to explain the complex web of actions and reactions that led to the current situation, emphasizing the critical role of international cooperation in addressing the challenges posed by Taliban-controlled Afghanistan's status as a terror nexus.

The Doha Peace Process: Misplaced Optimism

The Doha peace process, initiated with the aim of integrating the Taliban into Afghanistan's political framework, instead provided the group with an international platform that it leveraged to gain legitimacy and political influence. For example, the Taliban’s Qatar office facilitated travel by Taliban delegations to China, Russia, Iran and Uzbekistan. The Doha negotiation process was rooted in the optimistic belief that engagement and dialogue could transform the Taliban from a militant organization into a legitimate political entity, capable of contributing to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. The process culminated in the signing of the Doha Agreement in February 2020, which laid out the terms for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

However, the process was marred by a critical oversight: it underestimated the Taliban's commitment to their ideological and strategic objectives. Far from being a reformed group, the Taliban utilized the negotiations as means to project themselves as a changed entity while planning to reassert control over Afghanistan. During the intra-Afghan dialogue/negotiation in Doha, the Taliban emphasized that they had changed and were not the same Taliban as had ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s. I personally witnessed these assurances. In July 2019, during the intra-Afghan dialogue facilitated by the German and Qatari governments, when Taliban and Afghan government representatives met for the first time, Shahabuddin Dilawar, a senior member of the Taliban negotiating team, who served until July of 2024 as the Taliban's Minister of Mines and Petroleum, told us the “Taliban will not object to Afghan women’s education and work.” He further emphasised that “women can pursue education until PhD.” But after the Taliban took over, they established a regime of gender apartheid. The international community's engagement and the subsequent agreement inadvertently lent the Taliban a façade of legitimacy, which they exploited to enhance their position both domestically and internationally.

The mischaracterization of the Taliban's intentions was a fundamental error. By prioritizing the withdrawal of foreign forces and the pursuit of an elusive peace over the concrete realization of human rights and democratic principles, the Doha process facilitated the Taliban's strategy of waiting out international forces. The process's failure to adequately address and integrate the concerns of Afghan civil society and the Afghan government into the negotiations further compounded its shortcomings, leading to a power vacuum that the Taliban swiftly filled.

Pakistan’s Dual Strategy: A Counterproductive Geopolitical Gamble

Pakistan’s dual-faced strategy—ostensibly aligning with the global war on terror while covertly nurturing the Taliban—has been a crucial factor in enabling the Taliban's resurgence and, by extension, the transformation of Afghanistan into a haven for terrorism.

Historically, Pakistan viewed Afghanistan through the prism of its own security concerns vis-à-vis India and its quest for strategic depth. In the aftermath of the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan's intelligence and military establishments, while publicly supporting the U.S.-led efforts against terrorism, secretly provided sanctuary, financial support, and military training to Taliban elements, allowing them to regroup and launch a renewed insurgency against the Afghan government and its NATO allies.

From 2001 to 2009, the Taliban reorganized itself and re-emerged as a substantial threat. This period constituted a turning point, where the Taliban, instead of being a defeated force, morphed into a potent insurgency, thanks to its presence in Pakistan. The Taliban used Pakistani religious madrasas to train its forces and as a recruitment incentive. The Taliban leadership also benefitted from safe havens in Pakistan. The Taliban leadership operated from the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Peshawar, placing key leaders beyond the reach not just of Afghan forces but also all but the rarest of U.S. drone strikes.

The concept of the "good Taliban" versus "bad Taliban" emerged as a policy tool within Pakistan's strategic circles. The concept aimed to differentiate between groups that could serve Pakistan’s interests and those that posed a threat to its security – most notably between the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This narrative, skillfully marketed to the international community, particularly the United States, sought to exempt certain Taliban factions from counterterrorism operations, thereby preserving the core of the Taliban as a proxy force that could be wielded for geopolitical leverage.

This strategic gamble underestimated the ideological and operational cohesion among various Taliban factions. The emboldening of the Taliban led not only to a deteriorated security situation within Afghanistan but also inspired and strengthened the TTP, a militant group that has launched numerous attacks within Pakistan itself. The resurgence of the TTP underscores the short-sightedness of Pakistan's strategy.

Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, characterized by strategic miscalculations and a failure to foresee the long-term implications of such support, has been a critical causal factor in Afghanistan’s emergence as a sanctuary for terrorism. It also illustrates the role of regional politics, where strategic blunders and covert policies have had unintended consequences, amplifying the threat of terrorism and complicating the path to stability and peace in the region.

Terrorist Alliances and the Taliban's Return to Power

Prior to 2009, the Taliban's influence was primarily confined to the southern, eastern, and western regions of Afghanistan. From 2009 onwards, they expanded their presence into the northern and northeastern regions with the support of Central Asian terror groups. Key contributors to the Taliban's success in these areas included terrorist organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Ansarullah of Tajikistan, and the Turkistan Islamic Party. These groups leveraged their ethnic ties with local populations, recruiting Uzbeks, Tajiks, Aymaqs, and Turkmans to bolster the Taliban's ranks against U.S. and Afghan forces. The IMU notably led significant assassinations, targeted attacks, and suicide bombings in the north and northeast. Tragically, these efforts included targeted suicide bombings that killed numerous influential figures, including my father, a member of parliament from the northern province of Takhar.

As a former member of the Afghan security forces during 2014 -2017, I personally observed the detention of numerous fighters from Central and South Asian terrorist groups who were fighting alongside the Taliban. Despite multiple successes in containing and defeating the Taliban at key strategic bases across regions like Badakhshan, Nangarhar and Kunduz. Foreign terrorist reinforcements frequently assisted the Taliban in reclaiming these bases. Prior to the U.S. withdrawal, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), particularly the National Directorate of Security (NDS), played a crucial role in combating ISKP and other terrorist groups, successfully capturing high-profile ISKP leaders and disrupting ISKP operations in regions like Nangarhar.

Following the disorderly withdrawal of U.S. troops and the collapse of Afghanistan’s governmental and security structures, Afghanistan transformed into a launch pad for terrorist attack plots – by ISKP and other groups - targeting Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, and Russia.

Illustrating the potential for regional and global geopolitics to backfire, both Russia and Iran had provided covert support to the Taliban prior to the U.S. withdrawal, undermining the limited remaining U.S. security presence and hampering the Afghan forces’ anti-terrorism efforts.

Meanwhile, the Taliban is investing heavily in establishing new jihadi madrasas and cultivating a new generation of terrorist fighters, thereby re-establishing Afghanistan as a global terrorism hub and a significant threat to international peace and security.

A Cooperative Path Forward

In the wake of Afghanistan's transformation into a haven for terrorism under the Taliban's rule, international cooperation is critical. The interaction between diplomatic missteps, geopolitical rivalries, and the Taliban’s deft development of alliances has contributed to a fluid terror landscape and a dangerous security situation that transcends Afghan borders, posing a significant threat to regional and global peace.

This environment requires a reassessment of the international community's approach to counterterrorism. The fragmented responses and competing interests among global powers have hindered effective action against the spread of terrorism. Therefore, a shift towards targeted cooperation among the key nations, including the United States, China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, is essential. Even amidst great power competition, these nations must recognize the shared threat posed by the unchecked growth of terrorist networks in Afghanistan, necessitating a collaborative effort to counteract this menace.

Intelligence sharing and joint counterterrorism operations should serve as the pillars of this cooperative approach. By pooling resources and intelligence capabilities, countries can more effectively dismantle terrorist networks, disrupt their funding channels, and prevent the cross-border movement of militants. This collective effort requires not only sharing information but also coordinating actions to ensure that efforts are complementary and not counterproductive.

Key nations should also make a concerted effort to address the root causes of terrorism in Afghanistan, which include political instability, economic deprivation, and social grievances. International aid and development programs must be strategically designed to bolster the Afghan population's resilience against the allure of terrorism. This includes supporting education, healthcare, and economic development initiatives that can provide viable alternatives to joining militant groups. The international community's engagement should be predicated on a long-term commitment to Afghanistan's reconstruction and development, ensuring that aid does not inadvertently end up supporting terrorist groups.

Engaging the Taliban as a counterterrorism ally is a grave strategic error. Collaboration with the Taliban in counterterrorism efforts risks not only legitimizing their regime but also inadvertently empowering a network of associated terrorist organizations. This would complicate and potentially worsen the security landscape in Afghanistan and the wider region, undermining international counterterrorism objectives. Therefore, it is crucial that the international community refrains from depending on the Taliban for counterterrorism cooperation.

Lastly, it is crucial to leverage the human and intelligence resources developed by the ANDSF over the years. Many of these experienced personnel are now in exile but maintain contacts within Afghanistan and possess valuable insight into counterterrorism operations. Integrating these individuals’ expertise into regional counterterrorism strategies can enhance the effectiveness of efforts to combat the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan.