The Three Kinds of Declared U.S. Strikes in Somalia in 2023

The United States government has acknowledged conducting 19 strikes and counterterrorism operations (hereafter strikes, see note below) in Somalia in 2023. A close look at these 19 declared strikes distinguishes three different contexts in which U.S. strikes occurred:

1. As part of an effort to target al-Shabaab and IS-Somalia leaders;
2. In reaction to complex al-Shabaab attacks on military bases;
3. In what United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has labeled collective self-defense, but not in the immediate aftermath of a known complex al-Shabaab attack – often seemingly in support of Somali offensive operations.

The rest of this article examines the strikes that fell into each of these categories in 2023, and what they suggest about the U.S. counterterrorism war in Somalia. This analysis is based solely on strikes that the U.S. government acknowledged conducting in Somalia in 2023. It uses other sources to help evaluate the context of the strikes and place them within the above categories, but not to identify whether a strike occurred or how many people were killed. In some cases other sources have been used to provide context regarding who was killed.

Strikes Targeting Jihadist Leaders

In 2023, the United States declared three strikes or counterterrorism operations in Somalia that appear to fall into the category of targeting jihadist leaders.

January 25, 2023

On January 25, the United States conducted a counterterrorism operation in northern Somalia that killed Bilal-al-Sudani, who Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin described as “an ISIS leader in Somalia and a key facilitator for ISIS’s global network,” adding, “Al-Sudani was responsible for fostering the growing presence of ISIS in Africa and for funding the group’s operations worldwide, including in Afghanistan.” According to a call with reporters held on background, the operation killed around eleven ISIS members including al-Sudani.

May 20, 2023

On May 20, 2023, according to an AFRICOM press release, the U.S. conducted an airstrike in Jilib against al-Shabaab that injured one “al-Shabaab fighter.” Notably, the press release did not describe the strike as occurring in collective self-defense. LCDR Timothy S. Pietrack, an AFRICOM spokesman, told New America in a May 23 email that AFRICOM “assesses that one al-Shabaab leader was injured as a result of the operation.” Voice of America reported that the targeted leader was “Osman Mohamed Abdi, known as Moallim Osman.” Voice of America cited Somali officials as describing Moallim Osman as a “veteran commander” currently tasked with supervising attacks in Kenya and tied to the organization of multiple major al-Shabaab attacks.

December 17, 2023

On December 17, 2023, according to an AFRICOM press release, the U.S. “carried out an airstrike against the al-Shabaab terrorist group near Jilib.” AFRICOM assessed that “one al-Shabaab militant” was killed. As with the May 20, 2023 strike, this strike’s AFRICOM press release did not label it a collective self-defense strike. Later Somali officials confirmed that the strike killed Moalim Ayman, who led a unit responsible for major al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya. While AFRICOM has not officially confirmed his death, the New York Times reported that a “a U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, said the strike successfully targeted Mr. Ayman.”

Trends and Conclusions

The above strikes demonstrate that the U.S. continues to target al-Shabaab and IS-Somalia leaders in Somalia. This accords with reporting on U.S. actions in Somalia. In May 2022, the New York Times reported that President Biden “approved a Pentagon request for standing authority to target about a dozen suspected leaders of Al Shabab.”

The Times also cited officials to say that the standing authority to target leaders was aimed at “targeting a small leadership cadre — especially people who are suspected of playing roles in developing plots outside Somalia’s borders or having special skills.”

All three of the leaders targeted in the strikes above were reportedly involved in significant activity outside of Somalia. The U.S. highlighted al-Sudani’s “worldwide” influence including his ties to ISIS in Afghanistan and efforts to expand ISIS’ influence in Africa. Somali officials told Voice of America Osman Mohamed Abdi supervised attacks in Kenya and an incursion into Ethiopia. Likewise, the United States’ Rewards for Justice page describes Moalim Ayman as the “leader of Jaysh Ayman, an al-Shabaab unit that has conducted terrorist attacks in Kenya and Somalia” and as “responsible for preparing” the January 2020 attack at Manda Bay Airfield, Kenya that killed two U.S. personnel.

Strikes targeting leaders appear to make up a relatively small portion of U.S. operations in Somalia in 2023. Only three of 19 strikes targeted leaders. When it comes to the death toll of declared U.S. strikes in 2023, named leaders account for only two of the 118 people the U.S. assessed that it killed or about 1.7% a number similar to the 2% of reported deaths across the U.S. campaign in Somalia that were identified as leaders, according to New America’s tracking. In total the U.S. assessed that 12 people were killed in these strikes, which would mean deaths in strikes targeting leaders accounted for about 10% of the United States’ assessed death toll across its declared strikes. This aligns with the Times’ reporting that “Since Mr. Biden took office, airstrikes have largely been limited to those meant to defend partner forces facing an immediate threat.”

The two strikes that targeted al-Shabaab leaders both occurred in the vicinity of Jilib while the raid targeting an IS-Somalia leader occurred in northern Somalia. This aligns with the known geography of al-Shabaab and IS-Somalia activity.

Jilib and surrounding areas have long been al-Shabaab strongholds and recently the site of military clashes, and al-Shabaab has organized large protests in the area. Jilib has also been the site of prior U.S. strikes that targeted and killed al-Shabaab leaders. For example, an October 1, 2022 strike killed al-Shabaab commander Abdullah Yare in the vicinity of Jilib, and on February 24, 2020 a U.S. strike in the vicinity of Jilib targeted and killed Mohamud Salad, described by AFRICOM as an al-Shabaab commander “who led coordinated attacks against partner forces in the region.”

Similarly, IS-Somalia’s operating areas have long been described as Somalia’s northern mountains, where essentially all reported U.S. strikes against IS-Somalia have occurred, according to New America’s tracking.

Strikes Reacting to Complex Al-Shabaab Attacks

Two U.S. strikes in 2023 were labeled as collective self-defense strikes, and occurred in response to complex al-Shabaab attacks. According to a United Nations Panel of Experts report on Somalia published in early October 2023, complex attacks “usually involved Al-Shabaab detonating a vehicle- or person-borne improvised explosive device at the start of the attack to breach access to a facility or building, which is then followed by a ground assault, and occasionally included the use of a secondary vehicle- or person-borne improvised explosive device to target fleeing individuals, reinforcement units or medical first responders.”

The panel’s report, which does not cover all of 2023, identifies two complex attacks that align with declared U.S. strikes in Somalia. Those attacks are a January 20, 2023 attack on a Somali National Army base in Galcad and the May 26, 2023 attack on a Ugandan operated base in Bulo Marer.

January 20, 2023

On January 20, 2023, AFRICOM conducted what it termed a collective self-defense strike “approximately 260 km northeast of Mogadishu near Galcad, Somalia.” AFRICOM assessed that the strike (potentially in combination with partner forces on the ground) killed approximately 30 al-Shabaab terrorists. The AFRICOM press release explicitly described the strike as occurring in a location, “where Somalia National Army forces were engaged in heavy fighting following a complex, extended, intense attack by more than 100 al-Shabaab fighters.”

According to Reuters, early on January 20, al-Shabaab stormed a military base in Galcad, a town which had been captured by Somali forces the prior week, using car bombs in their attack. The Somali government admitted losing seven soldiers including a senior commander of the U.S. trained Danab special forces unit, who was the base’s deputy commander, in the fight. The U.S. drone strike came as a reinforcement once the battle began: Reuters reported, “Galcad resident Abdullahi Nur told Reuters he heard huge blasts at the base, followed by heavy fighting and air strikes early on Friday,” and drones being deployed to “reinforce” Somali forces according to a Somali military official.

May 26, 2023

On May 26, 2023, the AFRICOM conducted an airstrike “in the vicinity of the ATMIS forward operating base, FOB Bulo Marer,” assessing the strike “destroyed weapons and equipment unlawfully taken by al Shabaab fighters.” The press release did not mention collective self-defense, but in response to email inquiries from New America, AFRICOM stated that it assessed no one was killed in the strike and labeled it a collective self-defense strike.

The U.S. strike came in the aftermath of a complex al-Shabaab attack on the Bulo Marer Forward Operating Base. The UN Panel of Experts Report notes al-Shabaab launched a “pre-dawn” attack on the Ugandan-operated base using vehicle borne IEDs. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) statement on the attack places it as beginning around 5:00 AM. The panel of experts reports the attack killed at least 57 soldiers, and that al-Shabaab made off with “14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, 120 mm mortar launchers and ammunition, 107 mm rockets and launchers, QLZ-87 automatic grenade launchers, two T55 tanks, as well as radios, personal protection equipment and uniforms,” with the heavier weaponry being the reported target of the U.S. strike “later on the same day.”

Trends and Conclusions

The two strikes responding to complex al-Shabaab attacks provide a caution against interpreting the ups and downs of U.S. strikes in Somalia as driven by decisions by top policymakers in Washington D.C. in isolation from the vagaries of the battlefield.

The U.S. assessed that its January 20, 2023 U.S. strike in Galcad, killed 30 people. That makes it the deadliest American strike of 2023 according to U.S. assessments, although this may result from the inclusion of deaths caused by partner forces on the ground. This single strike – precipitated by a complex al-Shabaab attack – accounted for about a quarter of the total number of people the U.S. assessed that it killed in Somalia in 2023, and killed more than twice as many people as any other strike in 2023.

However, U.S. strikes in reaction to complex al-Shabaab attacks do not appear to necessarily involve higher death tolls. The U.S. assessed that no one was killed in its May 26, 2023 strike following the al-Shabaab attack of the Bulo Marer Forward Operating Base. This may reflect a difference in the role U.S. drones were called upon for in the two responses – in the deadlier January strike to reinforce a base that came under attack and which was still engaged in heavy fighting, and in the reportedly non-lethal May strike to destroy equipment being hauled away by a withdrawing al-Shabaab force. If such a difference explains the different death tolls, it would again illustrate the importance of the particular battlefield context – as well as policymaker decisions - to tallies of U.S. strikes and those they kill.

Other Collective Self-Defense Strikes

Out of the 19 strikes declared by the U.S. in Somalia in 2023, 14 (or almost three quarters) were labeled collective self-defense strikes but do not appear to align with immediate responses to major, complex al-Shabaab attacks. These strikes account for 76 (or about 64%) of the 118 people the U.S. assesses it killed in its strikes.

Rather than list each strike in this category, this section examines three sets of illustrative strikes.

January 23 and January 25, 2023

A set of two declared strikes on January 23 and January 25 in the vicinity of Xaradheere appear to have involved collective defense of Somali forces engaged in operations to secure the area, which Somali government forces had declared captured on January 16.

These January strikes do not appear to align with complex al-Shabaab attacks. The UN Panel of Experts report emphasizes the use of vehicular bombs or individual suicide bombers to breach a facility or building as a usual characteristic of such attacks. The press releases make no mention of such an attack. According to AFRICOM, this set of January strikes occurred in remote areas where Somali forces were conducting operations at the time they were attacked. While the press release for the January 20 strike responding to the complex attack in Galcad, which had likewise been declared captured on January 16, also referred to a “remote location of the fighting,” it explicitly described an order of activity that began with a complex al-Shabaab attack. In contrast, Somali press outlets and conflict trackers tend to portray the operations surrounding the January strikes in Xaradheere as offensive military activities aimed at clearing villages surrounding Xaradheere.

This apparent pattern raises concerns regarding the breadth of the collective self-defense label and what some analysts have described as a tendency for it to blur the line between defense and close air support for offensive operations.

February 10, 2023

A February 10, 2023 U.S. strike in the vicinity of Somali port town of Hobyo raises a similar concern about the blurring between collective self-defense and air support. AFRICOM announced that it conducted a “conducted a collective self-defense strike,” locating the strike “approximately 45 km southwest of Hobyo,” and assessing the strike killed twelve al-Shabaab fighters.

Although labeled a collective self-defense strike, Voice of America reported that “Brigadier General Mohamed Tahlil Bihi, infantry commander of the Somali national army, told state media that the militants were in trenches fighting against Somali government forces. He also confirmed an airstrike targeted the militants during the firefight with Somali forces.” This framing suggests the strike came in the context of offensive operations even if it was in defense of U.S. partners.

July 19, 2023

A July 19, 2023 strike provides yet another example of a collective defense strike that raises questions about the concept’s blurring into broader air support. For example, AFRICOM’s press release describes the July 19 strike as a “collective self-defense airstrike in a remote area near Hareeri Kalle” which “was in support of Somali National Army forces who were engaged by the terrorist organization.” However, Somali state news described the context in which the strike occurred as a “planned air and ground operation” that “targeted a gathering of al-Shabaab terrorists.” It also stated, “The Federal Government of Somalia expressed its appreciation for the assistance provided by the United States in helping to destroy the gathering of al-Shabaab terrorists who were planning to harass the Somali people.”

Conclusions and Trends

The above strikes (and other U.S. strikes in this category) point to the role U.S. airpower plays in supporting offensive operations, potentially stretching the concept of collective self-defense. However, care should be taken not to fully dismiss the United States’ emphasis on the concept of collective self-defense.

In an interview with West Point’s CTC Sentinel, Brigadier General Rose Keravuori, Deputy Director of Intelligence, United States Africa Command, directly acknowledged the support role of U.S. collective self-defense strikes while also distinguishing them from offensive strikes. She also signaled at a difference in the assessment of how effective offensive U.S. strikes would be stating, “When the forces we support are being attacked, we will conduct airstrikes for collective self-defense. That is clearly there to support them, to show them we are here to support their operations. And that is absolutely necessary. The jury is out, I would say, on how effective offensive airstrikes would be.” She further connected this concern to a concern about civilian harm, stating, “You can’t just indiscriminately conduct offensive airstrikes. We need to make sure that the Somali population is protected, and that’s one of our highest concerns. In some of these locations, it’s just something you can’t necessarily achieve.”

Although the number of U.S. strikes appears to be increasing, the United States’ reported death tolls have not reached the heights of some of the more explicitly offensive strikes conducted under the Trump administration. The highest U.S. assessed death toll of a 2023 collective self-defense strike outside the context of responding to a complex attack was 13 al-Shabaab fighters killed in an August 26 strike in the vicinity of Seiera, Somalia. The highest U.S. assessed death toll of any 2023 strike was 30 killed in the January 20 strike (and fighting) responding to a complex attack in Galcad.

In contrast, AFRICOM assessed that a strike it conducted on October 12, 2018 in Xaradheere killed 60 al-Shabaab terrorists. The press release for the strike makes no mention of it being an act of defense and explicitly referenced its role as support, stating, “Airstrikes reduce al-Shabaab’s ability to plot future attacks, disrupt its leadership networks, and degrade its freedom of maneuver within the region.” The prior year, the U.S. targeted an al-Shabaab camp on November 21, 2017 in a strike it assessed killed “more than 100 militants.”

While the October 2018 and November 2017 strikes represent a few cases of particularly high death tolls in operations targeting large al-Shabaab groups, the U.S. also conducted strikes at a faster pace under Trump than under the Biden administration so far, according to New America’s tracking. While the line between defense and support for offensive operations may be blurry, and the number of strikes under Biden has been increasing, the contrast with the Trump administration suggests there is a meaningful distinction between collective self-defense operations even acting as support and an embrace of offensive air strikes.

Why Distinguishing Strike Contexts Matters

The existence of seemingly distinct contexts in which the U.S. conducts strikes in Somalia raises important issues for analysts. For analysts focused on the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism war, grouping strikes of different kinds together may lead to incorrect conclusions about the effectiveness of American strikes because different strikes may be aimed at different purposes. For those seeking to analyze the trajectory of the U.S. war and whether it is escalating, de-escalating, or in a holding pattern, failure distinguish different kinds of strikes may conceal situations in which the war is shifting form potentially escalating in one area while de-escalating in another. Distinguishing strike contexts may also have relevance for those focused on identifying and tracking civilian harm whether from U.S. strikes themselves or from the kind of activity the strikes support.

Note: Counting strikes is difficult due to unclear and at times changing definition of what constitutes a strike. For the purpose of this analysis, I have relied upon AFRICOM’s self reporting of the number of strikes in its press releases. AFRICOM confirmed to me on January 18, that it conducted 18 strikes in 2023 in Somalia. For ease of reference, I refer to the counterterrorism operation on January 25 that killed Bilal al-Sudani as a strike. The government has acknowledged conducting that operation, but does not define it as a strike. It is worth noting that on January 25, AFRICOM released a statement declaring one strike consisting of two “engagements.” For this analysis, I have followed AFRICOM in treating the two engagements as one strike. AFRICOM provided a death toll for one of the strikes on 12/20 in response to a query from New America, but the assessed death toll for the second 12/20 strike has not been released.