Will drone swarms cause the next wave of civilian casualties in Libya?

The Turkish military directed its first drone swarm attack on a convoy and military base in Idlib, Syria on March 1, 2020, reportedly killing 19 people. This elevated use of force charts a new course of action for conflicts in the region; particularly those Turkey is involved in. Turkey primarily deploys its medium altitude long endurance (MALE) Anka and Bayraktar TB-2 drones across missions in Syria, and predominantly the Bayraktar TB-2 in Libya. What’s the difference between the two? The Anka-S (the newest model) is heavier, has a longer range, and has a higher payload capacity than the TB-2.

In Libya, Turkey’s new military capabilities may potentially escalate the conflict to unmatched levels, already heightened since opposition leader General Haftar’s April 2019 western offensive on the capital. Throughout 2019, Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) launched 910 airstrikes, killing between 67 and 114 civilians, taking the low and high estimates. The LNA also conducts strikes with the United Arab Emirates; 67 strikes conducted in 2019 resulted in between 125 to 167 civilian deaths. Turkey is relatively new to the conflict in Libya, supplying air and ground power to the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. Turkey conducted its first known airstrike in Libya in July 2019, which allegedly killed one civilian. Six months later, the Turkish Parliament sent 2,000 Syrian troops to support the GNA.

Now, imagine these military forces with enhanced capabilities – military grade drone swarms. State and non-state actors alike have come up with creative ways to develop armed drones of various capabilities. Commercial drones with munitions strapped to them is one option – ISIS mastered that tactic well at its height in Iraq and Syria. Then, there are commercial drone swarms, which can be even more effective if used strategically. Syrian rebels utilized drone swarms against Russian air base Khmeimim in Syria in 2018. Yet, neither of those scenarios compare to a country or non-state actor using military grade drones with swarming capability, and the mass destruction that would result.

There are numerous ways a drone swarm could work. For example, swarms may consist of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in coordination with a piloted jet; or multiple UAVs or UUVs (underwater unmanned vehicles) communicating together, responding to each other in real time. The key point is that the drones can all react to information they collectively receive and send, which is what makes this technique different from just a group of drones flying together. That sophisticated technology in the hands of belligerents across the Libya conflict would be devastating. The international backing of both the GNA and LNA creates an ever-worsening lawless Wild West dynamic across the country.

What are the options to mitigate this threat in Libya? The short-term ceasefire option has not worked. International summits and the United Nations have declared ceasefires without much success. For example, after the Moscow Summit this past January, Haftar left the ceasefire talks without signing an agreement. Arms embargoes go hand in hand with each declared ceasefire, but multiple countries continue to disregard those, such as Jordan, Turkey, and the UAE.

One medium-term option already taking place is to continue Track 1 Diplomacy discussions. The Follow-Up Committee (IFC) was proposed at the Berlin Summit in hopes that constant engagement might help reduce violence and move the conflict toward resolution. However, European leaders are at the helm of this, which is not automatically problematic, but Haftar and al-Serraj are at the point where they do not meet face to face. Another dialogue option is the 5+5 talks, or the Libya Joint Military Commission led by the United Nations, which permit five representatives from GNA and LNA leadership to discuss proposed next steps. These Track 1 options are a great start, but unofficial dialogues among civil society leaders in Libya might be a way to bridge divides across the country. Engaging local leaders empowers society and works towards healing from extreme trauma the country has faced.

Then there is a long-term option, a convention on armed drones. Drones are not explicitly stated in documents such as the Arms Trade Treaty or the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but use of drones and their implications can be applied there. Proliferation and use will get to a point where the international community is forced to make a decision about international law. Countries currently use grey areas in international law to justify use of drones, and we already see a lack of protection against civilians in strikes across Libya.

As the proliferation of swarm technology and other lethal tactics expands, civilians will suffer the most. It is up to the international community to enforce protocols that hold each other accountable before casualties and mass destruction from sophisticated drones cannot be walked back.