Foreign Policy Fault Lines in the 2024 Election

• As the 2024 U.S. presidential election approaches, economic concerns remain the primary issue for many voters, even amid the upheaval sparked by the assassination attempt against Trump and Biden’s exit from the race. But partisan and demographic divisions over the U.S. role in the world are emerging as critical factors in this election.
• Many Americans favor a neutral U.S. role in the Israel–Gaza conflict and support conditional aid to Israel. Black and Gen Z Americans are more critical of Israel, indicating a significant portion of Biden’s Democratic base is less supportive of his foreign policy agenda.
• Support for aid to Ukraine remains high, though it has declined overall, with less consensus on the duration of U.S. assistance. Black, Hispanic, Gen X, and Millennial Americans are more skeptical of long-term involvement, challenging Biden’s “as long as it takes” stance and leaning towards advocating for a peace settlement.
• Americans are adjusting to a multipolar world order. Across racial, ethnic, and generational lines, majorities believe the United States should play a shared, not dominant, leadership role globally. Younger, Black, and Hispanic Americans are less inclined to support active U.S. engagement, reflecting the nation’s wealth gap and its impact on foreign policy views.
• While a majority of Americans still support an active U.S. role in world affairs, demographic divides over the costs of global engagement indicate a growing preference for restraint. This is a crucial consideration for Washington’s foreign policy establishment and U.S. allies, regardless of who wins in November.

The national drama over President Joe Biden’s debate performance, the assassination attempt against former President Donald Trump, Biden’s exit from the race, and his endorsement of Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic Party nominee have reshaped the dynamics of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Many Americans are rightfully now wondering whether there will be more pyrotechnics before the next president steps into the White House on January 20, 2025.

If recent history is any guide, they can count on it.

Yet, the fundamentals of the election will remain the same. Voters will cast their ballots based largely on how they feel about the economy. With Harris, a staunch advocate of reproductive rights, now competing, issues like abortion may additionally take on more salience for some. But leading pundits and polls also agree that the Democratic and Republican Party’s radically different visions of U.S. foreign policy could be a decisive “X” factor come November.

“The Democratic and Republican Party’s radically different visions of U.S. foreign policy could be a decisive ‘X’ factor come November.”

The contentious Congressional debate over the $95 billion aid package to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan highlights Americans’ growing tendency to connect domestic woes to foreign policy decisions. Recent research conducted in partnership with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs shows a declining appetite for American primacy on the world stage and reveals generational and racial gaps in perceptions of the cost-benefit ratio of U.S. global engagement.

Amid growing income inequality, many Americans are facing a “guns versus butter” dilemma and questioning the trade-offs between foreign aid and domestic spending. While White and Asian Americans largely support an active U.S. global role, Black and Hispanic Americans are divided, and younger generations are skeptical. At the same time, a majority of Americans across the board are coming to terms with the idea that the U.S. is not in a position to go it alone. These demographic divides over foreign policy could nudge either candidate into the winning or losing column in a closely contested race.

Meanwhile, the world isn’t waiting for America to sort out its existential crisis. China is flexing its muscles, Russia continues to threaten Ukraine, and the Middle East remains a powder keg. Climate change looms over it all, a threat multiplier that knows no borders.

The next president won’t just inherit these challenges—they’ll face an electorate increasingly divided on America’s global role. It’s a recipe for paralysis at a time when decisive action is needed to grapple with the risks posed by today’s planetary challenges.

New America’s Planetary Politics team, with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, examined for a second straight year how demographic differences shape American views on foreign policy this election year. Building on the 2023 Chicago Council Survey, our study, also in collaboration with scholar Christopher Shell from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explores diverse American perspectives through flash polling and focus groups.

The survey included oversamples of Black, Hispanic, Native, and Asian, Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander (AAPI) Americans to draw meaningful and statistically significant conclusions. Our analysis, based on the survey results and focus group findings from March 2024 and shorter polls from February and March 2024, sheds light on voter attitudes nearly six months into the Israel–Gaza war and two years into the Ukraine conflict.

Respondents in our focus groups identified the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine as major concerns. They also mentioned competition with China, immigration, climate change, and crises in Haiti and Sudan. Taken in aggregate with polling results, the focus group responses were telling.

Partisanship deeply divides opinions on many issues, notably Ukraine, where overall support is strong but waning. Black, Hispanic, and younger Americans are less persuaded that aid to Kyiv is worth the cost, indicating that there is more appetite for a negotiated resolution within the Democratic Party base. Opinions on Israel’s actions in Gaza, meanwhile, vary, with many Black, Hispanic, Millennial, and Gen Z respondents feeling more uninformed. Those who are informed, especially among these groups, believe Israel’s military actions have gone too far.

While these diverse opinions may not directly translate into votes for a specific candidate, they offer critical insights into how voters view Trump’s “America First” agenda versus the Biden administration’s “foreign policy for the middle class.” Regardless of the election outcome, increasing partisanship and demographic divides over U.S. global engagement will impact America’s allies and adversaries alike for years to come.

“Increasing partisanship and demographic divides over U.S. global engagement will impact America’s allies and adversaries alike for years to come.”

The data indicates that minority and younger Americans are less willing to defend the current security status quo in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia with boots on the ground. By 2028, that more diverse cohort will make up a larger share of voters, potentially favoring a more cooperative and cost-conscious U.S. foreign policy. This demographic shift suggests that America’s allies should focus on future-proofing and shoring up relations with the United States beyond simply “Trump-proofing” institutions like NATO, considering the changing electorate’s preferences for global engagement.

After four turbulent years under Trump, Biden aimed to restore alliances, reinforce commitments, and reclaim America’s global leadership role. The chaotic withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan stands out as a costly blunder. But the Biden administration’s quick pivot in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had a galvanizing effect. Successes include America’s reentry into the Paris climate change agreement and the strengthening of alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Biden sought to align U.S. global engagement with domestic economic priorities, namely revamping trade as a tool for job creation and industrial protectionism.

In his speech at the Republican National Convention, Trump, by contrast, painted a dark picture of a “planet teetering on the edge of World War III.” It’s a theme that has come up repeatedly this campaign season, and polls show that many Americans believe the United States will be involved in a global conflict in the next five to 10 years. But Trump has been consistently vague about how he would neutralize the likeliest near-term threat—a NATO-Russia miscalculation in response to an escalation in Ukraine.

Trump has claimed that Russia attacked Ukraine because Russia’s President Vladimir Putin does not respect Biden, an assertion that is as illogical as it is ahistorical. Without offering any details, Trump said during the debate with Biden that he would have the war “settled” even before taking office. However, Trump rejected Putin’s ultimatum to Kyiv to give up the four regions annexed by Russia and to disarm as a condition for peace talks. Trump also repeated his complaint that NATO’s European members have failed to “pay their bills,” leaving the United States to pick up the lion’s share of the costs for military aid to Ukraine.

In actual fact, NATO has seen an unprecedented fourfold increase in defense spending since 2021. Although recent news that Germany, Europe’s largest economy, plans to cut aid to Ukraine in half by 2025 does not stoke confidence in the durability of promises made by America’s trans-Atlantic allies, and Baltic Sea states like Poland are less likely to waver. But all bets are off when it comes to U.S.-Europe relations if Trump wins.

Trump’s foreign policy is characterized by skepticism of multilateral agreements, a preference for bilateral deals, and a strong focus on reducing U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts. His appeal lies in his ability to resonate with voters who are disillusioned with globalism and yearn for a focus on domestic issues.

Trump’s vice presidential pick, Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), is very much a reflection of the GOP’s sharp break with the values that animated the party of Ronald Reagan. Vance has been a sharp critic of U.S. support for Ukraine and spearheaded the unsuccessful effort to block $61 million in aid to Kyiv. Like Trump, Vance is more hawkish in support of Israel.

Trump and Vance’s rhetoric on prioritizing American interests over foreign engagements finds a receptive audience among those concerned about the economic impacts of international aid and military interventions. The latter could add up to more latent support for Trump’s isolationist stance on Ukraine among Black, Hispanic, and younger voters who are feeling the pinch of the war’s costs at the gas pump and grocery stores.

Trump aligns with a significant portion of his Republican base, who view strong support for Israel as a key aspect of U.S. foreign policy. His administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Abraham Accords bolstered his standing among pro-Israel voters. However, Trump’s approach risks alienating Black and Hispanic voters who favor a more balanced and humanitarian-focused U.S. role in the Israel–Gaza conflict.

Trump expressed full-throated support for Israel while studiously sidestepping the question of whether the region’s 5.4 million Palestinians should be granted their own state. In an effort to paint his rival as weak on support for Israel, Trump in the debate called Biden a “bad Palestinian,” a racially charged insult that was on par with Trump’s comments that immigrants are taking “Hispanic jobs” and “Black jobs.” Yet, the Republican standard bearer offered few specifics on his plan for a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict beyond recommending that the United States should “let Israel finish the job.”

The Biden administration continues to tout a three-phase proposal for ending the conflict. The first phase entails a trade of the hostages for a six-week ceasefire, including the withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas of Gaza, the release of women and children being held hostage, and a surge in humanitarian aid. The second phase entails a return of all hostages in exchange for prisoner releases, followed by a final phase of reconstruction in Gaza.

As the war drags on, it is glaringly obvious that an Israeli–Palestinian detente is likely to remain out of reach while Hamas keeps fighting and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains in power. Moreover, there will be no path to a cessation of violence in the near term if Israel’s clash with Hezbollah escalates.

The good news is that majorities across racial and ethnic lines want the United States to play a shared leadership role in the world. There are, however, limits to this sentiment, and signs of an inward turn suggest a need for both candidates and their parties to recalibrate their foreign policy and do a better job of explaining why it pays for the United States to remain engaged.

The economic impact of the Ukraine war, particularly rising fuel and food costs, has exacerbated concerns over the current U.S. strategy. That has larger implications for the future of Europe’s security architecture.

A look at the cross tabs, for instance, reveals strong support for NATO. Majorities of White and Asian Americans support deploying troops to defend allies. But, strikingly, only 50 percent of Black Americans favor support for allies in the Baltics. Although Hispanic Americans are slightly more favorably inclined toward the defense of the Baltic states with 56 percent, just 50 percent support American boots on the ground to defend Germany. The subtext here is that while most Americans remain bullish on the trans-Atlantic partnership, a substantial part of the Democratic base is dubious about using military force to protect allies perceived as either being too remote, shirking their share of the burden, or both.

Views on the U.S. alliance with Taiwan were similarly divergent. While there is across-the-board support for sanctioning China and sending humanitarian and military aid in the event of an invasion, only Asian Americans supported sending troops.

During the 75th annual NATO summit in Washington, allied leaders touted the fact that 23 of 32 members are expected to hit the 2 percent of GDP defense spending target. They also promised an “irreversible path” to NATO membership for Ukraine, an expensive proposition that has seen Republican reticence and that may find declining support from the Democratic base in the future.

To date, neither party has fully articulated a vision for the endgame of the war in Ukraine, a fact that is concerning given that Chicago Council polling shows the significant role Russia’s invasion has played in American attitudes toward foreign policy.

Our study found that majorities of Black, Hispanic, Gen X, and Millennial Americans were less willing to endure higher costs of living to support Ukraine for as long as it takes to retake its territory from Russia and instead preferred that the United States encourage Kyiv to settle for peace.

But that view is neither axiomatic to capitulation to Putin’s outlandish demands nor does it suggest an expectation that peace negotiations would happen in the immediate term. With 61 percent of Americans across the board indicating strong majority support for continued aid to Ukraine, including six in 10 Black and Hispanic Americans in favor, there is a clear desire to see Kyiv achieve its strategic goals. A substantial slice of the electorate, however, would like to see victory achieved on a quicker timetable.

Economic disparities could be an influential factor in these views. Under Biden, household incomes have increased across the board, but significant racial and ethnic disparities persist. According to FactCheck.org, while nominal wages have increased by 16.64 percent between January 2021 and May 2024, the gains have not kept pace with inflation for many Americans, affecting their purchasing power.

Additional data provides further context on these disparities. A Pew Research report indicates that in 2021, the median net worth of Asian households was $320,900, compared to $250,400 for White households, $48,700 for Hispanic households, and $27,100 for Black households. This disparity in wealth has widened despite overall income increases, highlighting the persistent economic inequality between different racial groups.

The correlation between income constraints and support for foreign aid and allies also holds true for younger Americans, many of whom have struggled to find their financial footing amid rising student loan debt, rising housing costs, and, until recently, static wage levels. The median student loan debt for young adults aged 25 to 29 rose from $6,000 in 1992 to $16,000 in 2022, adjusted for inflation​.

Accordingly, a thin majority of Gen Z respondents said they are willing to go the distance in their support for Ukraine, but many focus group participants emphasized the need for U.S. involvement in a negotiated settlement between Putin and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky. “There needs to be an off-ramp, and it is unlikely that Ukraine will be marching into Moscow—Zelensky is in no political position to surrender, so Biden has to be the ‘bad guy’ and initiate the negotiations.”

At the same time, some focus group participants expressed dissatisfaction with the Biden administration’s over-focus on escalation management. One Hispanic American participant, for example, complained that the United States is “not continuing to provide [Ukraine] the support when needed. Not providing planes. Not providing enough support so they can actually get Russia out of their country.”

Reading between the lines, it seems there is more support for a “whatever it takes” approach to Ukraine rather than an “as long as it takes” strategy for indeterminate ends. In other words, there is likely a stronger mandate to lift restrictions on the use of military weapons and provide more sophisticated gear than the Biden administration has been willing to act on. In theory, that should both speed the culmination of the conflict and give Zelensky’s government a stronger hand at the negotiating table. Either way, the United States will need to move with greater urgency to work with Kyiv and NATO allies to clearly define a menu of options for acceptable negotiated outcomes.

Similar dynamics are at play when it comes to the carte blanche approach that has long characterized U.S. policy on Israel. Biden’s handling of the Israel–Gaza conflict has especially roiled the Democratic base. His campaign has faced backlash from Arab Americans, progressives, and younger voters who demand a more balanced U.S. approach that pressures Israel to moderate its actions in Gaza. During the primaries, a substantial number of voters—about 650,000—chose the “uncommitted” option or cast protest votes in the Democratic primaries.

War in the Middle East has also exposed a deepening rift between Black Americans and the Democratic Party. In the days following Israel’s attack on the Rafah refugee camp, the NAACP issued a statement calling on Biden to “draw the red line and indefinitely end the shipment of weapons and artillery to the state of Israel.”

While those who show up at the polls will mostly be motivated by economic considerations, questions about foreign policy may linger in the back of some voters’ minds. Our study showed a substantial divergence, for instance, between younger and older Americans as well as Americans of color on Israel’s war in Gaza.

Interestingly, many respondents—across race and age—said they felt they did not know enough about the situation in Gaza to have an opinion about Israel’s justification for military action. This was especially noticeable among Black, Hispanic, Millennial, and Gen Z respondents, another sign that Biden’s messaging on a critical foreign policy priority might not be reaching a key swath of voters. Among younger, Black, and Hispanic Americans who said they do know enough, more say Israel has gone too far in its military operations.

It should not be surprising that older Americans are more supportive of Israel’s military action while younger generations are more concerned about Palestinians’ plight. Many older Americans remember well the 1973 oil embargo that followed the Yom Kippur War, and the data back that up. Pluralities of Boomers and Silent Generation Americans—people Trump and Biden’s age—think that Israel is justified in defending its interests. Except for the Silent Generation, most Americans think the United States should pressure Israel to curtail its military operations in Gaza, either by reducing military aid or exerting diplomatic pressure.

It’s hard to predict with any certainty how these trends will play out in terms of U.S.-Israel relations. Although it is likely some Democrats will boycott Netanyahu’s coming speech to Congress, Israel’s leader has shown an unwillingness to shift his political calculus as a result of wavering American support. The Israeli Knesset’s recent majority vote affirming opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state indicates the gap between Washington and Jerusalem on solutions is substantial. Given the tight race this year for control of the House and the Senate, Israel’s political elite can count on friction in the relationship with Washington in the near and medium term.

At a minimum, Israel should expect that the longer the war in Gaza goes on, the greater American skepticism will grow around the efficacy of sending aid to Israel. With the expected renegotiation of Israel’s memorandum of understanding with the United States looming in 2028, that could in time add up to delayed or reduced deliveries of needed military supplies or both. If those trends prevail, they could undercut Israel’s defense capabilities. Much as the mandate for aid to Ukraine has limits, so too does the no-limits approach to aid to Israel.

The 2024 U.S. presidential election will be a referendum on America’s role in the world, with profound implications for both domestic and international politics. Divergent views among Americans of different ages and races reflect broader societal debates about the benefits and costs of U.S. foreign engagements. As the two candidates vie for the presidency, their ability to navigate these complex and often conflicting perspectives will be crucial in determining their electoral success. One thing they’ll both have to contend with is growing disenchantment with American exceptionalism.

For Biden’s successor, the challenge lies in maintaining support from a diverse coalition that demands a more nuanced understanding of American power and attention to domestic priorities. For Trump, the path forward involves harnessing the isolationist sentiment that has gained traction among his base and growing its appeal for fence sitters, particularly among Black, Hispanic, and younger voters.

But one big takeaway is that although Americans vary in their support for U.S. engagement in the world, many are coming to embrace the end of American primacy. For Trump-aligned Republicans, the reality check points to more aggressive protectionism, a transactional view of alliances, and rejection of liberal order norms as the north star of foreign policy. For Democrats, there is greater support for the existing security architecture but less consensus on how to manage relations with allies and adversaries in light of diminished American influence on the world stage.

“Although Americans vary in their support for U.S. engagement in the world, many are coming to embrace the end of American primacy.”

Yet, majorities of Americans across the board—even those who lean isolationist—agree the United States should play a shared, not dominant, leadership role. Most want their country to enhance its military, technological, and scientific edge while serving as a beacon for democratic values. If this sounds like mixed messaging, it is probably because neither Republicans nor Democrats have landed on the right formula articulating a new vision for how America should navigate the emerging multipolar world order.

Ahead of the presidential elections, the lack of clarity is especially unnerving for America’s traditional allies. But what many abroad have failed to fully reconcile is that America’s inward turn started well before Trump’s first term in office, and it is likely to outlast the next presidential administration. Public fatigue with policing the world and anxiety over the financial and human toll of U.S. military interventions in the Middle East ratcheted upwards after Obama announced U.S. plans to draw down troops in Afghanistan in 2014. With each passing year since, the pendulum swing toward a U.S. retreat from world affairs has been increasingly pronounced.

A Pew Research Center survey indicated that support for active U.S. involvement in global affairs has been steadily declining, with only 43 percent of Americans in favor in 2023, down from 53 percent in 2019. Our colleagues at the Chicago Council likewise found in their September 2023 poll that Americans are increasingly inclined to turn inward. This shift is mirrored in the attitudes of focus group participants who expressed concerns about the trade-offs between foreign aid and domestic priorities.

As one Asian American focus group respondent put it, the one constant in this new era is inconstance: “Overall, I believe we try to do the right thing on a global stage, but I think that the different White House occupants have had vastly different priorities, which can make it difficult for our partners.” Our research shows, however, that most Americans agree that the United States cannot solve today’s planetary problems on its own.

“Most Americans agree that the United States cannot solve today’s planetary problems on its own.”

For allies, adopting a dual strategy of mitigating risks on security priorities and incentivizing U.S. cooperation on issues where there is alignment will be critical for global stability no matter who ends up winning in November.

In Europe, that means prioritizing closing its defense gaps faster, building consensus on a Ukraine–Russia resolution, and girding the bloc’s economy and institutions for the real possibility of a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan and the South China Sea. It may also mean finding creative ways to convince ordinary Americans, not just elites in Washington, of the added value of the trans-Atlantic partnership. One way to do this might be to lean into EU soft power, enhancing solidarity on global governance and expanding pathways for enduring cultural exchange between Europeans and Americans.

In Asia, for Taiwan especially, it means crafting an insurance policy around the likelihood of delayed or disrupted American aid. Rising middle powers like Vietnam will likely continue to benefit from a policy of not choosing between China and the United States. Again, if suasion over American foreign policy is a goal—and it should be—building intercultural inroads and collaborating on trade goals will be crucial.

In the Middle East, the outlook remains complicated. The United States is unlikely to withdraw its support for Israel, but Jerusalem could soon run up against more conditionalities. That militates in favor of reengagement on a two-state solution, however unpalatable that may seem at the moment.

Ultimately, the election outcome will not only shape the future of U.S. foreign policy but also the broader global order. The world needs to get ready for what lies ahead.