What the Iran Crisis Reveals About Arms Control: Managing Uncertainty in a Post-Agreement Era

When U.S. and Israeli forces recently struck Iranian nuclear sites, it was more than just a tactical operation—it was the result of years of diplomatic breakdown. With formal talks stalled and Iran’s program disrupted by joint strikes but not dismantled, the space for negotiation has shrunk. This moment highlights a larger trend: When strategic uncertainty—marked by ambiguous intentions, absent diplomatic frameworks, and deteriorating verification—takes hold, it becomes much harder to control.

The Trump administration’s 2018 decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief and other provisions, marked a significant turning point towards strategic uncertainty. That choice aligned with its “America First” foreign policy: skeptical of multilateral agreements, cautious of foreign entanglements, and based on the belief that economic and military pressure would produce better results than negotiated settlements. However, from a strategic uncertainty standpoint, the decision introduces notable long-term risks.

How Strategic Uncertainty Grows

Arms control is more than just limiting weapons—it’s a way to manage ambiguity. It gives structure to mistrust, predictability to hostile actions, and limits to escalation.

The U.S. exit from the JCPOA without a replacement raised several questions: Would Washington honor future agreements? What were its red lines? How would allies adjust without a stable U.S. anchor? The maximum pressure campaign ended up diffusing rather than restoring leverage, stretching U.S. influence across too many fronts without clear strategic prioritization, alienating key allies, and eroding the multilateral consensus that had underpinned prior diplomatic efforts.

In the absence of coordinated pressure, enforcement mechanisms like international inspections and sanctions lost effectiveness, weakening the very tools that had once reinforced U.S. credibility. Historically, the United States used diplomacy to reduce nuclear risk in moments of tension, from Cold War arms control treaties to the JCPOA itself. These successes did not rely on trust, but on recognition that structure and verification reduce the odds of conflict. When that structure is removed, ambiguity becomes instability.

A Pattern of Unmanaged Ambiguity

The current crisis with Iran reflects a broader pattern of U.S. challenges in managing strategic ambiguity, especially with North Korea.

The United States has long aimed to limit North Korea’s nuclear program through talks and sanctions. But during the Trump administration, summit diplomacy and high-profile meetings substituted for more structured negotiations, raising global hopes without producing enforceable results. Focusing on optics rather than solid frameworks ultimately led to dashed hopes and ongoing nuclear advancements, showing how ambition without a firm structure can heighten uncertainties that diplomacy aims to address.

The result was not leverage but confusion. Nuclear progress in North Korea continued under a shadow of uncertainty, with few tools remaining to monitor or deter it. President Biden’s more cautious approach—eschewing summits and offering talks—was rebuffed. Pyongyang demanded sanctions relief and accelerated weapons development. With no traction or restored oversight, ambiguity remained the rule.

In both cases, the pattern is clear: When ambiguity isn’t managed through clear policy, sustained diplomacy, and institutional support, it becomes a force multiplier for conflict.

Consequences of a Vacuum

After the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran systematically rolled back compliance. It enriched beyond agreed caps, deployed advanced centrifuges, stockpiled nuclear material, and curtailed inspector access. The visibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collapsed, and what had been a tightly monitored program became increasingly opaque.

As talks stalled, Iran’s actions—paired with its plan for a new enrichment facility—pushed tensions higher. From an arms control perspective, viewing these steps as preludes to breakout, Israel struck key sites like Natanz and later Fordow. The United States joined, citing nonproliferation, Israeli self-defense, regional stability, and the need to reestablish deterrence. That shift—from would-be mediator to direct actor—marked a decisive break from earlier policy and lacked a clear endgame.

As uncertainty grows unchecked, policy becomes governed by worst-case assumptions, diplomacy narrows, and the logic of crisis overtakes the logic of risk reduction. This is what’s unfolding now.

Continuity and Disruption in Arms Control History

The Iran crisis mirrors past proliferation episodes. North Korea left the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and went nuclear after the Agreed Framework collapsed. Iraq secretly pursued enrichment in the 1980s. Syria built a covert reactor at Al Kibar before Israel destroyed it in 2007.

Each case shows that when diplomatic frameworks are seen as inadequate or unreliable, states will act, seeking leverage, deterrence, or survival.

But Iran marks a break: The United States deliberately chose to dismantle a functioning agreement without an effective replacement. Now, by striking nuclear sites, the United States is enforcing nonproliferation not through diplomacy, but through force. That reflects both the erosion of formal arms control and a growing default to unilateralism over institutions, inspections, and law.

The Trump administration’s decision to exit the JCPOA did not just reverse a policy—alongside withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and Open Skies agreements, it reversed a model of engagement, assuming that isolation could succeed without multilateral support or a diplomatic offramp. It revealed the limits of short-term leverage in a long-term strategic environment.

What the United States Should Do

Escalation hasn’t eliminated diplomacy—it makes it more urgent. To restore stability, the United States must:

• Rebuild diplomatic backchannels with Iran, directly or through trusted intermediaries.
• Coordinate with allies to reestablish shared thresholds and verification standards.
• Explore phased de-escalation steps that restore IAEA visibility and strategic clarity.
• Reframe deterrence not as an alternative to diplomacy, but as a tool to support it.

None of this requires restoring the JCPOA in its original form. But it does require acknowledging that arms control, when practiced with discipline, remains a powerful tool for managing uncertainty in a multipolar world. What’s needed now is not nostalgia for past agreements, but adaptation to present conditions.

In an Age Without Treaties

The collapse of the JCPOA isn’t an anomaly but a preview. Looking ahead, the United States must prepare for diplomacy in a world where treaties are the exception. Today’s arms control landscape is defined by fractured alliances, regional deterrence, and escalating ambiguity.

Managing uncertainty must become a core principle of U.S. strategy. That means investing in early-warning diplomacy, reinforcing the IAEA, and building flexible coalitions that can defuse crises without defaulting to force.

Arms control must be reframed as an evolving toolkit including track-two diplomacy, reciprocal restraint, deconfliction channels, and region-specific risk reduction. Future efforts must be built for durability, with bipartisan support, institutional scaffolding, and regional buy-in. In a world of persistent uncertainty, success won’t be measured by signed treaties but by how often war is averted, ambiguity reduced, and diplomacy kept alive.